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This thesis contains four chapters presenting theory and empirical evidence for
two distinct aspects of human behaviour: social learning and motivated beliefs.
I develop a simple theory to revisit the classical social learning models by challeng-
ing the assumption of freely available information. My model suggests that when
it is costly to acquire information, social learning (herding) is prevalent, and peo-
ple do not have incentives to acquire private information (e.g. to form their own
judgements). Classical information cascade models suggest that although herding
is observed, information aggregation is still possible with communication chan-
nels (e.g. a survey); however, my model indicates that information aggregation
is unattainable because people in the herd do not acquire private information.
We then test my model in a laboratory and find that, as predicted, subjects
can learn from others successfully. Also, individual heterogeneity exists in: there
are herd animals biased against private information, lone wolves who are biased
toward it and subjects who behave optimally. In aggregate, there is no overall
bias for or against private information. We also document a new cognitive bias
involved in processing social information. Individual characteristics, especially
the cognitive ability, seems to be a very good indicator of subjects’ behaviour.
Subjects with higher cognitive scores choose optimal information more frequently
and follow information more frequently.
Overconfidence can be driven by the consumption motive (e.g. savouring future
payoff/self-image) and the instrumental motive (e.g. being optimistic about the
outcome of effort for motivation). I develop a simple model incorporating these
two motives and suggest that individuals hold a dynamic pattern of overconfi-
dence.
Then I conduct an online field experiment with students to test the theory. The
experimental findings indicate that students are likely to adopt overconfident
beliefs as a commitment device to deal with their self-control problem. However,
I do not find evidence for the consumption motive of overconfidence.
Lay Summary
Economists believe that following others is often beneficial because one can learn
valuable information from other people’s behaviour. Those models often assume
that people have personal judgement, and can observe the actions of their neigh-
bour with no costs. I believe that this assumption is not realistic in many cases.
Therefore, I develop a simple social learning model in which information ac-
quisition is costly. My model indicates that information aggregation often fails
because people have no incentive to form a personal judgement. In other words,
the possibility of learning from others prohibits people producing original ideas.
We then test the above model in a lab. We design an experiment in a computer-
based laboratory and recruit 128 human subjects. Subjects are incentivised to
choose the optimal information helping them to make the optimal decision. Our
experimental findings suggest that people can anticipate the information value
embedded in other people’s actions. Although on average people are not biased
towards private information, individual heterogeneity presents. About 10% of our
subjects never choose to observe other people’s actions even when it is optimal to
do so. Another 10%, on the contrary, always engage in social learning regardless
of the situation. Finally, we find individual characteristics, such as cognitive
ability and personality, can explain social learning behaviour.
The second topic I present in this thesis is motivated beliefs, specifically, over-
confidence. Economists believe that economic motivations drive people to hold
overconfident beliefs. The first motivation is the consumption value of overconfi-
dence that people feel happy to hold positive views about themselves. Another
motivation is to deal with self-control problem. By holding overconfident beliefs
about the outcome of efforts, people may exert more efforts in the face of the
self-control problem (e.g. study more, save more, etc.). Based on earlier models,
I produce a simple model explaining the dynamics of students’ confidence level. I
also conduct an online field experiment to collect students’ confidence level data.
My experiment suggests that students use overconfident beliefs as a tool to deal
with their self-control problems.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
Human beings are social animals, and the social aspect of people has been ad-
dressed in many fields of research, including biology, psychology and economics.
Since Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992), there is a growing lit-
erature on social learning (herding) to study why and how are people learning
from others.1 Many real life examples are a result of herding, such as bank runs,
financial market bubbles, fashions and social trends. One common assumption
adopted by earlier social learning models is that individuals have access to in-
formative private information with no costs. In reality, forming a reasonable
personal judgement is often costly in terms of time, money, effort and attention.
The same cost argument applies to the public information: it can also be costly
to observe other people’s behaviour.
To address this issue, I develop a simple model with costly information acquisition
in chapter 2 of this thesis. This model focuses on the information acquisition as-
pect of social learning. Consistent with the classical models, information cascades
are predicted. In contrast to the classical social learning models where informa-
tion cascades form stochastically, my model predicts that information cascade
starts deterministically at the fourth agent in a sequence. Also, in contrast to
the classical models, my model indicates that even if communication channels are
available, “the wisdom of the crowd” (information aggregation) is unattainable
because agents in the cascade do not have strict incentives to acquire private
information.
The experimental evidence on social learning is abundant. However, since many of
these experiments are driven by the models of Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani
et al. (1992) and the design of Anderson & Holt (1997), subjects in the experiment
are given both private and public information. In such settings, social learning
problem is reduced to an information interpretation problem: to what degree one
should follow the public. However, in reality (and consistent with the model pre-
sented in chapter 2), before interpreting information, an individual often has to
acquire the relevant information at the first place. Therefore, the external validity
of the conclusion from existing experiments that people overweight their private
information (for a meta-analysis see, Weizsäcker, 2010) is limited because the in-
1Notable theoretical papers include and not limited to L. Smith & Sørensen (2000); Banerjee
& Fudenberg (2004); Acemoglu et al. (2010); Guarino et al. (2011); Guarino & Jehiel (2013).
For experimental papers, see for example, Anderson & Holt (1997), Hung & Plott (2001) and
Weizsäcker (2010).
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formation acquisition aspect of social learning is ignored. In chapter 3, we report
a social learning experiment designed to identify bias in information acquisition.
In contrast to the standard sequential social learning experimental design where
subjects are given both private and social information prior to guessing an un-
known binary state of the world, in our experiment, subjects must instead choose
between receiving a private signal or seeing the guesses made by previous sub-
jects in the sequence (i.e., social information). By requiring our subjects to make
this choice at different points in the sequence, our within-subject design allows
us to separate biased from optimal information choices. We find heterogeneity
in bias, with some subjects consistently choosing social information when private
information is optimal and vice-versa. We also find that subjects’ programme of
study, individual traits and cognitive ability can explain the extent of bias in their
information choices. We also document that subjects exhibit efficiency concerns
in longer sequences, associated with increased use of private signals.
The first part of this thesis addresses issues on the social and interpersonal as-
pects of human behaviour, while in the second part, I focus on the behavioural
bias from the intrapersonal perspective. Specifically, I study the intrapersonal
motives of overconfidence. In chapter 4, I develop a model of motivated overcon-
fidence based on (Bénabou & Tirole, 2002, 2016). Consistent with the previous
models, both consumption motive and instrumental motive present, and lead to
overconfident beliefs. On the other hand, my model contains two key features
differing from the literature. First, I introduce a waiting stage where the agent
is no longer able to change the already exerted effort level but still needs to wait
for result realisation. Second, I propose a quadratic cost for distorting beliefs,
and thus, it is increasingly more costly for people to hold more extreme beliefs.
Consequently, this model predicts that the agent holds a dynamic pattern of
overconfident belief changes over time. Agents start with high expectations to
counteract the present temptation, and to savour the positive feelings; Then be-
liefs drop but still overconfident during the waiting stage for anticipatory purpose
before dropping down to its lowest level at the realisation stage.
Then I test my motivated overconfidence model through an online field study,
and the results are presented in chapter 5. The study is conducted with under-
graduate students from two core economics courses who are required to submit
a coursework essay. With the help of the online teaching system “Blackboard
Learn”, I collect students’ beliefs about their essay performance multiple times
through a series of online surveys. Although students are not overconfident, I
2
find a clear dynamic pattern of students’ confidence level. Specifically, they are
most optimistic about their essays while working on it, and become much less
confident after the submission of the essay, with their confidence level remaining
unchanged until the release of essay marks. The dynamics of the confidence level
are consistent with a possibility that students adopt inflated beliefs as a motivator
to pursue difficult goals, providing an experimental support for the instrumental
motive of overconfidence. In contrast, the consumption motive hypothesis is not
supported by the data.
3




Human beings are social animals and the social aspect of the human race has
been addressed in many fields of research, including biology, psychology and eco-
nomics. Herd behaviour (or uniform social behaviour) has been heavily discussed
by economists since the two seminal papers by Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchan-
dani et al. (1992). The main insight of this theoretical literature is that herd
behaviour/information cascade can be a rational response to the information
contained in the actions of others. Many real life examples can be described as
the phenomena of herding, such as bank runs, financial market bubbles, fashions
and social trends.
The existing models assume that each agent has an informative private signal and
at the same time can observe her predecessors’ decisions with no cost1. Arguably,
in reality, neither social nor private information is freely available. Information
acquisition costs are in terms of money, attention, time, effort and so on. With
costly information acquisition, rational agents may acquire either social or pri-
vate information, but not both.2 In our model, agents have to choose which
information to observe rather than having free access to both private and so-
cial information. Existing studies emphasis on the interpretation aspect of social
learning–after observing both private and social information, how agents update
their beliefs. However, interpretation of information is not the entire story since
interpretation is conditional on information acquisition. Our model completes the
theoretical literature by emphasizing the importance of information acquisition
in social learning when information is costly.
The outline of the present model can be illustrated with the following example.
Suppose a student has to choose between two optional courses A and B. Suppose
she has no prior information about which course will equip her with more valuable
skills. A student can acquire information through two channels. First, she could
1One notable exception is Song (2016). In his model, private information is freely available
and social information can be endogenously acquired.
2Even in cases where information is freely available, people may choose to avoid information
due to several psychological factors such as ostrich effect (Karlsson et al., 2009), choking under
pressure (Dohmen, 2008) and disappointment aversion (Andries & Haddad, 2014).
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search for private information by reading the syllabus, textbooks, past papers,
the website of course coordinator and so on. Second, she could acquire social
information by observing what did her peers choose. Of course, she may decide
to obtain both types of information, however, given information acquisitions are
costly in terms of time and effort, in many cases, she may choose only one source
of information. In such cases, either private or social information can be optimal
depending on the specific contexts. For example, the private channel is optimal if
the courses are offered for the first time or social observation is difficult and the
social channel is optimal when credible historical information about the decisions
made by other students is available.
The formal set up of this model is based on the classical social learning models.
There is an underlying binary state of the world. A finite number of agents se-
quentially make a binary decision with the goal of matching the true state. Before
making the above decision, each agent chooses between (1) receiving a private
informative but imperfect signal regarding the true state and (2) observing the
binary decisions made by all her predecessors but not their information choices.
Consistent with classical models, this model predicts the formation of information
cascades and the failure of asymptotic learning.3 On the other hand, rather than
a stochastic formation of information cascades in classical models, cascades form
deterministically in this model. Another distinction is that the “wisdom of the
crowd” is unattainable even if communication channels in the present model since
agents in a cascade do not have strict incentive to acquire private information.
In the classical models, people follow others but each individual holds an infor-
mative and independent signal. Consequently, if communication channels (e.g. a
survey) are available, information aggregation is still possible. However, in my
model, because acquiring information is costly, people in equilibrium do not have
incentives to form their own judgement, they simply follow their predecessors.
This result challenges the validity of social surveys.
2.2 Literature Review
The idea of informational cascades is firstly proposed to explain social herding by
Bikhchandani et al. (1992). In their paper, an informational cascade forms when
agents rationally ignore their own information and imitate the behaviour of other
agents, for the reason that others might be better informed. In their paper, a
3Asymptotic learning refers to the convergence in probability to the correct action as the
size of a social network grows (Acemoglu et al., 2011).
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real-world journal submission example is given. The referees read the submitted
paper, assess its quality, and make the decision. Suppose a referee at a second
journal knows that the paper was previously rejected by the first journal. Under
the assumption that the referee cannot assess the paper’s quality perfectly, the
prior rejection tends to favour another rejection. The same logic goes on to the
subsequent referees: if it is known that a paper has been rejected by so many
previous journals, the chance of future rejection would be high. This idea is
modelled mathematically in a relatively general setting with sequential choices,
and it can be shown that at some point an agent will rationally ignore her own
private information and simply follow the social information – the information
accumulated from previous decisions. Once this particular point is reached, an
informational cascade forms and all subsequent decisions become uninformative
since no private information is revealed. However, information cascade is fragile
because, in equilibrium, individuals may rapidly converge on one decision based
on little information. As a result, behaviour in cascades is fragile with respect to
small shocks–fragility arises systematically.
Banerjee (1992) adopts a very similar theoretical model towards this issue. In his
paper, the term “herd behaviour” is used to describe the situation when people
are imitating others with the belief that social behaviour may reflect valuable
information. The mathematical model in Banerjee (1992) is extremely simplified
and very close to the discrete choice model introduced by Bikhchandani et al.
(1992).4 Banerjee (1992) focused on the welfare aspect of such herding. When
agents in the sequence ignore their private information and imitate their prede-
cessors, a negative “herd externality” is imposed on the rest of the population.
This negative externality comes from the fact that if those herding agents had
followed their private information, their decisions would have provided additional
information to the rest of the sequence. Therefore, the existence of informational
externalities causes a loss of social welfare. Hence the society might be better off
if the early agents in the sequence are not allowed to observe the choices made
by their predecessors (thus they have to rely on their own information). It leads
to an interesting conclusion: “destroying information can be socially beneficial”
(Banerjee, 1992, p. 811).
L. Smith & Sørensen (2000) develop a model of agents with heterogeneous pref-
erence, and find that herding is not the only possible long run outcome. “Con-
4Although the choice variable is continuous in Banerjee (1992), under his maintained as-
sumptions it shares the properties of a discrete choice model.
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founded learning”–an informational pooling equilibrium where social history is
not informative for anyone may occur in their model. In that case, beliefs con-
verge to a limit point and history offers no decisive information for any agent. And
thus each types actions forever split between two actions. L. Smith & Sørensen
(2000) also emphasise the difference between informational cascades and herd
behaviour. They argue that informational cascades occur when, after some finite
time, all agents completely ignore their private information, while herd behaviour
occurs when all agents make the same decision but not necessarily ignoring their
private information. In other words, in a herding situation, agents choose the
same decision, but they may have behaved differently if the realisation of their
own private signals had been different as they do not ignore their private infor-
mation completely. While in an informational cascade, agents choose to follow
the behaviour of predecessors without regard to private signals since they believe
the social information is so strong that no private information can outweigh it
and thus they ignore their private information completely. In our paper, we use
the term informational cascade to describe the potential social learning process
since when agents choose social information, no private signal will be observed
(they ignore their private information entirely).
Acemoglu et al. (2010) also model social learning with heterogeneous agents. In
their model, agents are of multiple types and the uncertainty of type distribution
presents. On the one hand, information is correctly aggregated when preferences
of different types are closely aligned. On the other hand, when heterogeneity
in preferences is sufficient, asymptotic learning may be distorted due to identi-
fication problems where agents cannot learn from the history even in the long
run. The failure of information aggregation in Acemoglu et al. (2010) is fun-
damentally different from classical information cascade models by Bikhchandani
et al. (1992) and Banerjee (1992). In Acemoglu et al. (2010), information may
fail to aggregate because agents cannot identify the history efficiently with the
presence of type distribution uncertainty; while in classical information cascade
models, information aggregation fails because the private signal is bounded (not
informative enough to utilise compared to social information).
Information cascade models are also challenged by several researchers. Bernheim
(1994) proposes a model describing conformity based on social interaction where
individuals care about social status. It is an alternative explanation of herding
compared to social learning models. Avery & Zemsky (1998) build a theoretical
model explaining the herding in the financial market. In their model, the role of
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the price mechanism is considered in the aggregation of private information within
a sequential decision-making economy. When traders have private information
on only a single dimension of uncertainty, price adjustments can prevent herding.
Gale (1996) challenge the robustness of the formation of informational cascades
by questioning the strong assumptions shared by the social learning models such
as exogenous timing, discrete timing & choices and the symmetry of equilibrium.
The most closely related paper to ours is Song (2016). In his paper, the obser-
vation structure is endogenous that agents can strategically choose to observe
the set of actions. Since making observations is costly, the equilibrium outcome
depends on the relative strength of private information as compared to cost. His
model indicates that asymptotic learning never occurs with endogenous observa-
tion structure as agent sometimes chooses not to make any observation.5 Also,
an interesting welfare conclusion suggests that costly observation may entail bet-
ter learning because costly observation can sometimes reduce herding external-
ity. The main difference between Song (2016) and this study is the availability
of private signal. In his paper, private signal is freely available while in our
model private signal is, similar to social information, costly and endogenous.
The main argument is that in many real life events agents may have no private
belief/information/idea about the decision problem.6
2.3 The Model
Each of N players faces the same task of guessing the correct state of the world. N
players form a sequence, and each player has an exogenously determined position
n ≡ {1, 2, ..., n, ..., N}. Let player n to denote the player with position n. The
state of the world, θ ∈ {0, 1} is binary with equal prior probabilities. Players
sequentially make a decision dn ∈ {0, 1}. The payoff is 1 if dn = θ and 0 otherwise.
For each player, before making the decision dn, she can choose one from the
following two pieces of information in ∈ I(n) = {sn, hn}. The first is an in-
dependently generated private signal sn ∈ S = {0, 1}, with the accuracy of
q ∈ (0.5, 1) ∀ sn. Specifically, Pr(sn = 0|θ = 0) = Pr(sn = 1|θ = 1) = q and
Pr(sn = 0|θ = 1) = Pr(sn = 1|θ = 0) = 1−q for all players. The second is a com-
5This is a contradiction to Acemoglu et al. (2011) where asymptotic learning is possible
with exogenous observation structure.
6For example, a new mother may have no private signal about which formula is better for
her baby. She can acquire private information by reading instructions/tasting/calling helpline
etc., but these activities are costly. Therefore I believe the freely available private signal may
not be a natural assumption.
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plete history of the decisions made by all predecessors hn. Specifically, h1 is empty
set, h2 = {d1}, h3 = {d1, d2}, h4 = {d1, d2, d3} and hn = {d1, d2, d3, ..., dn−1}.
Players can only observe the final decisions of others, not the information chosen
by others. We call this second option hn as social information.
Therefore a player has to solve two problems: first, given her position in a se-
quence, which of the two pieces of information to choose. And second, after
observing the information she chooses, which decision to make. A strategy for






n : n→ I(n) repre-
sents information choice at different positions. µdn : I(n)→ {0, 1} represents the
final decision. A strategy profile is a sequence of strategies µ = {µ1, µ2, ..., µN}.
The sequence of decisions {dn} is a stochastic process. The probability measure
generated by this process is Pµ.
2.3.1 Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
We define µ∗ as a pure strategy perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE). Thus
µ∗n maximises the expected payoff of player n given µ
∗
m<n. Specifically, both two
mappings in equilibrium µi∗n and µ
d∗
n must be best responses, given µ
i∗
m<n and
µd∗m<n, to I(n) and {0, 1} respectively. The second mapping, interpretation of the
observed information in our game is straightforward: subjects should follow the
information they observe. For the private signal, as it is informative (q > 0.5),
subjects should follow it. For social information, as all subjects in a sequence face
the same true state and are individually incentivised in the same way, participants
have the incentive to follow their predecessors. Thus the key question is which
information to observe in the first place (µin). It can be shown formally by the
following two equations with equation (2.1) for µd∗n and (2.2) for µ
i∗
n . Let y
∗(in)
be the best response final decision given information in.
y∗(in) = arg max
y∈{0,1}
Pµ∗m<n(y = θ|in) (2.1)
Where Pµ∗m<n is the probability measure given all player m with m < n are
adopting the optimal strategy. Therefore the best response mapping is µd∗n : in →
y∗(in). Taking µ
d∗





∗(in) = θ|n)] (2.2)
The solution of equation (2.2) is the optimal information choice. Thus given any
position n, there is an optimal binary information choice in ∈ I(n). The existence
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and exact form of PBNE can be illustrated inductively from the beginning of the
sequence. To deal with the multiple equilibria caused by indifference, we adopt
a similar indifference-breaking rule as in the previous social learning literature
(Banerjee, 1992)7.
Assumption 1. When a player is indifferent (in terms of expected payoff) be-
tween choosing private information and social information, she always chooses
private information.
Assumption 1 states that a player chooses private information when following pri-
vate or social information leads to the same expected payoff. This assumption is a
minor variation of the assumption in Banerjee (1992), where a player is assumed
to follow private information when being indifferent. One way to rationalise this
assumption is through the lens of the trembling hand perfect equilibrium (Sel-
ten, 1975). Since the predecessors might have a trembling hand (make mistakes),
one should follow her own signal instead of their predecessors if the information
value of these two sources are the same.8 Our equilibrium prediction with this
assumption is effectively equivalent to the extensive-form trembling hand per-
fect equilibria where the tremble probabilities approach to zero. Based on this
assumption, the following lemmas are proposed.
Lemma 1. In PBNE, at positions 1, 2 and 3, all players choose and follow private
information.
Proof. For player 1, as social information set h1 is empty and private signal s1
is informative, player 1 should choose and follow private signal and expect an
expected accuracy (the probability of guessing the correct state) EA(s1) = q.
Thus d1 = s1.
For player 2, if she follows the information she observes, she knows EA(h2) =
EA(d1) = EA(s1) = q and also EA(s2) = q. Thus she is indifferent between
choosing private and social information in terms of expected payoff and according
to Assumption 1, she chooses and follows private signal s2.
For player 3, if she chooses h3 = {d1, d2}, she will face two possible outcomes:
either decisions of the two previous players are the same (d1 = d2) or not (d2 6= d2).
Since h3 = {d1, d2} = {s1, s2}, the probability of observing these two situations
7Another popular indifference-breaking rule (Bikhchandani et al., 1992). They assume
agents choose private and social information with probability 12 when the expected payoffs of
following the two types of information are the same. In the Appendix A, I show that the main
result is consistent with either assumption.
8For example, player 2 under Assumption 1 should choose and follow private information.
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given d1 = s1 and d2 = s2 are noted as Pr(d1 = d2|d1 = s1, d2 = s2) and
Pr(d1 6= d2|d1 = s1, d2 = s2), respectively.
Pr(d1 = d2|d1 = s1, d2 = s2) = Pr(s1 = s2) = q2 + (1− q)2
Pr(d1 6= d2|d1 = s1, d2 = s2) = Pr(s1 6= s2) = 2q(1− q)
The expected accuracy EA(d1 = d2|d1 = s1, d2 = s2) when player 3 faces two
same decisions and follow them is given as:
EA(d1 = d2|d1 = s1, d2 = s2) =
q2
q2 + (1− q)2
The expected accuracy EA(d1 6= d2|d1 = s1, d2 = s2) when player 3 faces two
different decisions and randomly choose one is simply 1
2
because two independent
signals cancel each other.9 Thus total expected accuracy of social information is
the sum of these two outcomes:
EA(d1, d2) = Pr(d1 = d2) · EA(d1 = d2) + Pr(d1 6= d2) · EA(d1 6= d2)
= q2 + q − q2 = q
Therefore, it shows that for player 3, choosing and following social information
h3 will yield no higher accuracy than private signal s3. Thus by Assumption 1,
player 3 will choose and follow private signal s3 in equilibrium.
Lemma 2. In PBNE, all players with position n ≥ 4 choose social information.
Proof. For the fourth player (player 4), she must choose between h4 = {d1, d2, d3}
and s4. If she chooses to acquire the social information h4, the rational decision
rule would be to follow the median (majority) among {d1, d2, d3}. We will show
that the accuracy of choosing social information h4 and follow the majority will
be higher than following private signal s4.
There are 4 different cases player 4 may face when choosing social information
9By Bayes’ rule:
Pr(θ = 0|d1 6= d2) =





= Pr(θ = 1|d1 6= d2)
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h4:
1. all three previous guesses are correct.
2. two out of three previous guesses are correct.
3. one out of three previous guesses are correct.
4. all three previous guesses are false.
Thus only in case 1 and 2, player 4’s guess will be correct if she chooses and follows
social information h4. The expected accuracy of choosing the social information
h4 for player 4 is the probability sum of case 1 and 2. Let Pr(1, 1, 1) represent the
probability that the first three players are correct about the state of the world.10
EA(h4) = Pr(1, 1, 1) + Pr(1, 1, 0) + Pr(1, 0, 1) + Pr(0, 1, 1)
= q3 + q2(1− q) + q2(1− q) + q2(1− q) = 2q(1− q)(2q − 1)
EA(h4)− EA(s4) = 3q2 − 2q3 − q = 2q(1− q)(2q − 1)
Given q ∈ (0.5, 1), this difference EA(h4)−EA(s4) > 0, and thus player 4 chooses
social information h4 and d4 is the majority of d1, d2 and d3.
For the fifth player (player5), she faces a choice between h5 = {d1, d2, d3, d4} and
s5. Given i4 = h4, s4 is not observed. Let function χ(in) be the total number of
private signal contained in the information set in,
χ(h5) = χ(h4) = 3
Therefore, EA(h5) = EA(h4) > EA(s4) and thus i5 = h5. By induction, the
same logic applies to all subsequent players:
χ(hn) = χ(h4) ∀ n ≥ 4
in = hn ∀ n ≥ 4
Social information is ambiguous if it contains the same number of zeros and ones




Lemma 3. In PBNE, ambiguous social information is never observed.
10By the same way, for example, Pr(1, 0, 1) stands for the probability that the player 1 and
player 3 are correct while player 2 is wrong.
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Proof. Agents with an odd position may potentially observe ambiguous social
information. However, in equilibrium as proved in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2,
player n = 1, 3 chooses private information and with n = 5, 7, ..., 2C + 1, social
information is chosen but effectively learning from the first three agents where a
clear majority (unique median) exists.
With above Lemmas, Proposition 1 provides a description of the equilibrium of
our model.
Proposition 1. With Assumption 1, PBNE information choices i∗n can be char-
acterised as:
i∗n =
sn, if n ≤ 3hn, if n ≥ 4 (2.3)
PBNE information interpretation y∗(in) can be characterised as:
y∗(in) =
sn, if i∗n = snmedian of {d1, d2, d3} if i∗n = hn (2.4)
Two additional properties of our equilibrium are presented in the following. I be-
gin with asymptotic learning to study the information aggregation of this model.
As in Acemoglu et al. (2011), asymptotic learning is achieved if the decisions of
players in later positions in a sequence convergent to the right action as the social
network becomes large.
Corollary 1. In PBNE, asymptotic learning is not achieved.
Proof. In our model, asymptotic learning is achieved if limn→∞ Pr(dn = θ) = 1
given Pµ∗m<n . According to the equilibrium outcome of our model in Proposition
3, asymptotic learning is never achieved in our model as limn→∞ Pr(dn = θ) =
3q2 − 2q3 < 1 given Pµ∗m<n and q ∈ (0.5, 1).
Corollary 2. In equilibrium, agents in the cascade do not have strict preference
for acquiring private information.
Proof. Corollary 2 shows that for n ≥ 4, who are in the informational cascade,
do not have strict incentive to acquire private information after observing social
information. Let ε > 0 be the cost of acquiring private information, our following
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proof shows that for any positive value of ε, player 4 does not acquire private
information in equilibrium.
In equilibrium, dn = sn for n ≤ 3. If the following equation holds, player 4
will acquire an additional private signal. Otherwise, she does not acquire private
information.
Pr(d4 = θ|s1, s2, s3, s4)− ε ≥ Pr(d4 = θ|s1, s2, s3) (2.5)
Following the same rule in the proof of lemma 1 and 2, the expected accuracy of















· q2(1− q)2 − ε (2.6)
Simplified to get:
3q2 − 2q3 − ε (2.7)
As we have previously shown that the RHS of equation (5) equals 3q2 − 2q3
Therefore, for any value of ε > 0, equation (5) does not hold.
In sum, Corollary 1 shows that asymptotic learning is unattainable in equilibrium
when social and private information are alternatives. This result is consistent with
classical information cascade models. Corollary 2 indicates that agents in the
herd do not have strict incentive to acquire private information even if it is free.
Consequently, information aggregation is likely to be failed even if there exist
communication channels.11 This result contradicts the classical models where
communication channels are effective to aggregation information (Bikhchandani
et al., 1998). Also, our information structure and the experimental design in the
next chapter that agents can only acquire one source of information is not very
restrictive because agents in the cascade indeed do not have incentives to acquire
private information for any positive cost.
11For example, a social survey is one type of communication channel as the survey can ask
for individuals’ private judgement (before social learning). However, these methods fail in this
model because when acquiring information is costly, people do not choose to obtain private
information at the first place.
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2.4 Level-k Analysis and Behavioural Agents
The previous section describes the equilibrium outcome for rational agents. The
model of levels of reasoning relaxes the assumption of mutually consistent beliefs,
while retains the idea of strategic behaviour with optimal responses (e.g. Crawford
et al., 2013; Rabin, 2013). The main idea of the level-k model is to impose a
certain structure on the players’ beliefs about the other players’ strategies and
to allow for heterogeneity among the players. Specifically, agents hold different
beliefs about other players’ level of thinking. I apply the same assumption as
in Nagel (1995) that agents hold a degenerate population-level belief where all
other players are believed to be exactly one level of reasoning below oneself. If an
agent believes that all her predecessors are L0, then she would adopt L1 strategy,
which is the best response to L0 predecessors. By the same logic, L2 strategy is
the best response to L1 predecessors, etc. Consistent with most existing studies,
L0 is assumed to be uniform random in terms of all possible strategies (Crawford
et al., 2013).
Additional notations are introduced as following.
αn ∈ [0, 1] is the probability that player n chooses private information.
βn ∈ [0, 1] is the probability that player n follows the information she observes.
Specifically, following information is defined as following the median of informa-
tion observed, and randomize the decision with probability 1
2
when the informa-
tion contains multiple medians.
iLkn ∈ {sn, hn} is the information choice made by player n with Lk. k ≥ 0 and for
k = 0, player n does not hold any belief about other agents. When k > 0 player
n believes all predecessors being L(k-1).
yLk(in) ∈ {0, 1} is the interpretation rule (mapping from information observed to
final decision) adopted by player n after observing in. k ≥ 0 and when k = 0,
player n does not hold any belief about other agents. When k > 0 player n be-
lieves all predecessors being L(k-1).
ωLkn ∈ [0, 1] is the perceived expected accuracy of dn by player n herself holding
the belief that all predecessors are L(k-1) for k ≥ 1. When k = 0, player n does
not hold any belief about other agents, and we assume ωL0n equals the objective
expected accuracy of 1
2
. ωLkn can also be viewed as the confidence level (how sure
she believes her decision is correct).
ΩLkn ∈ [0, 1] is the expected accuracy of choosing and following social information






dn = θ|ωLk1 , ..., ωLkn−1; in = hn; yLk(in)
)
, if k ≥ 1;
1
2
, if k = 0.
(2.8)
Intuitively, ΩLkn is the probability of matching the correct state for player n with
level Lk, believing all her predecessors are L(k-1), given social information is
observed and the interpretation rule yLk(in) is utilised.
2.4.1 L0–Naive Behaviour
Since L0 agents uniform-randomly make decisions, α = β = 1
2
. The objective
expected accuracy of player 1 with L0 is βq+ (1−β)(1− q) = 1
2
. That means for
the following agents, the decision of player 1 is completely uninformative. The
same calculation can be extended to later sequence.




Similarly, ωL02 always equals to 1/2 regardless of the value of q. That means for
the following agents, the decision of player 2 is completely uninformative as well.
The same way of representation applies to ωL03 ,..., ω
L0
n .
ωL0n = αβq + α(1− β)(1− q) + (1− α)βΩL0n + (1− α)(1− β)(1− ΩL0n ) (2.9)
It is not difficult to show that equation (2.9) equals 1
2
∀ n. Intuitively, since every
agent is L0, social information is completely uninformative ΩL0n =
1
2
→ ωL0n = 12 .
2.4.2 L1–Cursed Learning
For L1 players, they act best responsively to L0 predecessors. The intuition is
straightforward: if it is believed that all previous guesses are uninformative, the
best one can do is to choose and follow her own private signal. Thus the level1
strategy (holding the belief that all predecessors are purely random players) is
always to choose and follow the private signal regardless of their position in
the sequence, i.e. iL1n = sn ∀ n. Consequently, ωL1n = q ∀ n. L1 agents are
individualistic because agents do not trust predecessors’ rationality. L1 behaviour
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is the prediction of Eyster & Rabin (2005) fully-cursed equilibrium.
2.4.3 L2–Naive Learning
For L2 players, they hold the belief that all their predecessors are L1 and thus are
best responding to L1 players. Consistent with Proposition 1, L2 players with
n ≤ 3 choose private information. Also, L2 players with n ≥ 4 choose social
information since it is more informative. However, in PBNE, for any n ≥ 4,
player n will decide according to the median of the first three players only in the
sequence. In contrast, L2 players believe all predecessors are revealing private
information and thus learn from all predecessors equally. Formally,
iL2n =
sn, if n ≤ 3hn, if n ≥ 4 (2.10)






median of {d1, d2, ..., dn−1}, if hn has unique median
random, if hn has multiple median
(2.11)





























2 , if n is odd
(2.12)
By the strong law of large numbers:
lim
n→∞
ωL2n = 1 (2.13)
Equation (2.13) is a result of information aggregation where asymptotic learning
is achieved. In other words, L2 agent believes all her predecessors are reveal-
ing independent private information and thus trust the wisdom of the crowd.
In reality, L2 agents are naive learners as they take other people’s decisions at
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face value and fail to appreciate the potential correlations in the history. Naive
learners usually are overconfident about their choices due to redundancy neglect
(Eyster & Rabin, 2014). In other words, naive learners hold overconfident beliefs
about their decision because they fail to realise the fact that the history may be
based on very few independent decisions.
2.4.4 L3–Equilibrium Strategy
For L3 players, they believe that all predecessors are L2, so they know that all
predecessors will act as described in equation (2.10) and (2.11). It is straightfor-
ward to show that iL3n = sn for n ≤ 3 since private information choice is the best
response to any predecessors for the first three players.
In addition, given iL2n = sn for n ≤ 3, iL34 = h4 as we have proved in Lemma 2. As
L3 agents believe that iL2n = hn for n ≥ 3, they know that information aggregation
is very limited to only the first three players. Therefore, the interpretation rule of
L3, iL3n is the same as the PBNE interpretation y
∗(in). In other words, L3 agents
are learning cautiously (only based on the first three players) because they can
anticipate the redundancy in the history. Since L3 strategy is indeed PBNE
strategy, L4 strategy (the best response to L3) is the same as L3. By the same
logic, all the higher levels of reasoning players will behave as the same as L3.
Position Info Choice Info Interpretation
n L0 L1 L2 L3 L0 L1 L2 L3
1 s1 s1 s1 s1 rand fol s1 fol s1 fol s1
2 rand s2 s2 s2 rand fol s2 fol s2 fol s2
3 rand s3 s3 s3 rand fol s3 fol s3 fol s3
4 rand s4 h4 h4 rand fol s4 naive fol h4 fol h4
≥ 5 rand sn hn hn rand fol sn naive fol hn fol hn
Note: We assume player 1 cannot choose h1 since h1 = ∅.
rand stands for a random choice.
fol stands for an interpretation rule that follows the median of the ob-
served information with the appreciation of redundancy. Specifically, fol sn
means follow the private signal observed. fol hn means follow the median
of {d1, d2, d3} ∀ n. Whereas naive fol stands for an interpretation rule that
follows the median of all predecessors (without appreciation of redundancy).
Specifically, naive fol means follow the median of {d1, d2, ..., dn−1} ∀ n
Table 2.1: A Summary of Information Choice and Interpretation with Level k
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Position Perceived Accuracy (ωLkn )
n L0 L1 L2 L3
1 0.5 q q q
2 0.5 q q q
3 0.5 q q q
4 0.5 q −2q3 + 3q2(> q) −2q3 + 3q2(> q)
≥ 5 0.5 q converge to 1 −2q3 + 3q2(> q)
Note: The perceived accuracy is calculated given the information
choice and interpretation listed in Table 2.1. It is the accuracy
“perceived” by the corresponding agent. converge to 1 refers
to equation (2.13): limn→∞ ω
L2
n = 1
Table 2.2: A Summary of Perceived Accuracy with Level k
2.5 Extension: Costly Information (Endogenous Acquisition)
In this section, I extend the baseline model by introducing information acquisition
cost and relax the assumption that only one type of information can be observed.
Assume agents now can acquire either private or social or both information for
some costs. We normalise the payoff of correct decision to 1, and 0 otherwise:
π(dn|dn = θ) ≡ 1; π(dn|dn 6= θ) ≡ 0. Most notations are consistent with our
previous definition. A new information set is denoted as Ĩ(n) where in ∈ Ĩ(n) =
{∅, sn, hn, {sn, hn}}. Agents have to choose one and only one element from Ĩ(n)
as their information choice in. Let C(in) be the cost of acquiring information.
C(sn) be the cost of acquiring private information, C(hn) be the cost of acquiring
social information and C(sn, hn) be the cost of acquiring both. For simplicity, we
consider the case where C(∅) = 0 and C(sn) = C(hn) = 12C(sn, hn) = C > 0.
After observing in, agents make a final decision dn. We now show that our
equilibrium outcome varies with different values of C.
2.5.1 High cost
We show that when the acquisition cost is high, no information is acquired in
equilibrium.
Lemma 4. Neither social nor private information is ever acquired in equilibrium
if C > q − 1
2
.
Proof. Lemma 4 states the fact the when information acquisition cost is too high,
agents will make final decisions without any private or social information. Anal-
ogously, when the benefit of information acquisition is lower than the acquisition
cost, no information is acquired. Formally, in = ∅ if and only if:
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E[π(dn|in = ∅, y′(∅))] > E[π(dn|i′n 6= ∅, y′(in))]− C(in) ∀ i′n 6= ∅ (2.14)
Where y′(in)
12 is the optimal mapping from information in to decision dn given
the probability measure of the stochastic process {dn} in this game, P̃µ. Equation
2.14 is the information acquisition rule adopted by player n. The left hand side
part of Equation 2.14 has a constant value given y′(∅) and uniform distributed
θ:




Equation 2.15 shows that the expected payoff of acquiring no information is 1
2
.
With the above equations, Lemma 4 can be proved inductively. For player 1,
h1 = ∅ so the only sensible information acquisition is i1 = s1. Her expected
payoff of acquiring s1 is:
E[π(d1|i1 = s1, y′(s1))]− C(i1) = q − C (2.16)
Given C > q − 1
2
, Equation 2.16 has a value < 1
2




and χ(h2) = 0. Thus for player 2, she knows social information h2
is uninformative and thus effectively face the same situation as player 1. As a
consequence, i2 = ∅ =⇒ π(d2) = 12 and χ(h3) = 0. By the same logic, we can
show that χ(hn) = 0 ∀ n and in = ∅ ∀ n.
2.5.2 Medium cost
We show that when the acquisition cost is medium, agents will behave the same
as we described in our baseline model where only one type of information can be
observed.
Lemma 5. Informational cascade forms and persists with probability 1 for n ≥ 4
if C ∈ (−2q3 + 3q2 − q, q − 1
2
].
12We define y′(∅) as a discrete unif{0, 1}. In other words, when player n observes no
information, her final decision dn is equally likely to be 0 or 1.
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Proof. For player 1, i1 = s1 since Equation 2.16 ≥ Equation 2.15 when C ≤ q− 12 .
Consequently, π(d1) = q and χ(h2) = 1.
For player 2, by the same logic for player 1, i2 6= ∅. In addition, her preference
for i2 is s2 ∼ h2  {s2, h2} as:
E[π(d2|i2 = {h2, s2}, y′(i2))]− C(i2) = q2 + q(1− q)− 2C
= q − 2C < q − C
(2.17)
By Assumption 1, we conclude that i2 = s2, π(d2) = q and χ(h3) = 2.
For player 3, by the same logic for player 1, i3 6= ∅. By Lemma 1, s3 ∼ h3. We
then calculate the expected payoff for i3 = {s3, h3} = {s1, s2, s3} by the same
process shown in the proof of Lemma 2:
E[π(d3|i3 = {s3, h3}, y′(i3))]− C(i3) = −2q3 + 3q2 − 2C (2.18)
Given C ∈ (−2q3 + 3q2 − q, q − 1
2
], Equation 2.18 < q − C. Thus for player 3,
s3 ∼ h3  {s3, h3}. By Assumption 1, we conclude that i3 = s3, π(d3) = q and
χ(h4) = 3.
For player 4, since h4 = {d1, d2, d3} = {s1, s2, s3}, as described in Lemma 2,
h4  s4 because:
E[π(d4|i4 = h4, y′(i4))]− C(i4) = −2q3 + 3q2 − C > q − C (2.19)
In addition, Corollary 2 suggests:
E[π(d4|i4 = {s4, h4}, y′(i4))]− C(i4) = −2q3 + 3q2 − 2C (2.20)
By comparing the payoff of Equation 2.19 and 2.20, we show that for i4: h4 
{s4, h4}. Therefore, i4 = h4, π(d4) = −2q3 + 3q2 and χ(h5) = 3.
For n ≥ 5, as shown in the proof of Lemma 2, in = hn, π(dn) = −2q3 + 3q2,
χ(hn) = 3. Informational cascade persists.
21
2.5.3 Low cost
We show that when the acquisition cost is low, player 3 acquires both private
and social information. In addition, consistent with the case of medium cost,
informational cascade forms and persists for sure for n ≥ 4.
Lemma 6. Both social and private information are acquired for n = 3 if C ∈
(0,−2q3 + 3q2 − q].
Proof. Follow the same analysis in the proof of Lemma 5, player 1 and player 2
choose private information (i1 = s1 and i2 = s2). The expected payoff for player
3 with i3 = {s3, h3} is:
E[π(d3|i3 = {s3, h3}, y′(i3))]− C(i3) = −2q3 + 3q2 − 2C (2.21)
Given C ∈ (0,−2q3 + 3q2 − q], Equation 2.21 ≥ q − C(the expected payoff of
i3 = s3 and i3 = h3). Therefore i3 = {s3, h3} and d3 = median of {s1, s2, s3}
=⇒ π(d3) = −2q3 + 3q2, χ(h4) = 3.
Lemma 7. Informational cascade forms and persists with probability 1 for n ≥ 4
if C ∈ (0,−2q3 + 3q2 − q].
Proof. In the proof of Lemma 6, we show that d1 = s1, d2 = s2 and d3 =
median of {s1, s2, s3}. In this proof, we show that i4 = h4 and d4 = d3 =
median of {s1, s2, s3}. As h3  s3, h4  s4. We only need to show that h4 
{s4, h4} so that i4 = h4. player 4 knows that effectively h4 = {s1, s2, d3} where
d3 = median of {s1, s2, s3}.
First, we show that the expected accuracy of d4 given i4 = h4 is the same as
d3 given i3 = {s3, h3} because χ(h4) = χ({s3, h3}) = 3 (they share the same
information):
E[π(d4|i4 = h4, y′(i4))] = E[π(d3|i3 = {s3, h3}, y′(i3))] = −2q3 + 3q2 (2.22)
Second, we show that the expected accuracy of d4 given i4 = {s4, h4} is the same
as d4 given i4 = h4. There are two possible cases of h4 = {d1, d2, d3}: Case (a)
d1 = d2 ⇐⇒ s1 = s2 and Case (b) d1 6= d2 ⇐⇒ s1 6= s2. The probability
of observing these two cases are denoted as Pr(a) and Pr(b) respectively and
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Pr(a)+Pr(b) = 1. Therefore we have Pr(a) = q2+(1−q)2 and Pr(b) = 2q(1−q).
In Case (a), d3 = d1 = d2 ∀ s3 because in the case s3 6= s1 and s1 = s2, following
s1 is more likely to be correct:
Pr(s1 = θ|s1 = s2 6= s3) =
Pr(s1 = s2 6= s3|s1 = θ) · Pr(s1 = θ)
Pr(s1 = s2 6= s3)
= q > 1− q
(2.23)
Therefore in Case (a), d3 = d1 = d2. d3 is independent of s3 and such indepen-
dence implies d4 = d1 = d2 = d3 because Equation 2.24 provides exactly the same
result as Equation 2.23:
Pr(d1 = θ|d1 = d2 = d3 6= s4) =
Pr(s1 = s2 6= s4|s1 = θ) · Pr(s1 = θ)
Pr(s1 = s2 6= s4)
= q > 1− q
(2.24)
Equation 24 indicates that player 4 with i4 = {s4, h4} makes final decision d4 = d1
in Case (a) regardless of s4. Let Π(a) be the expected payoff of player 4 with
i4 = {s4, h4} facing Case (a), then we have:
Π(a) = Pr(s1 = θ|s1 = s2) · Pr(s4 = θ) + Pr(s1 = θ|s1 = s2) · Pr(s4 6= θ)
=
q2 · q
q2 + (1− q)2
+
q2 · (1− q)
q2 + (1− q)2
=
q2
q2 + (1− q)2
(2.25)
In Case (b), d3 = s3 because in the case s1 6= s2, following s3 is more likely to be
correct:
Pr(s3 = θ|d1 6= d2) =
Pr(d1 6= d2|s3 = θ) · Pr(s3 = θ)
Pr(d1 6= d2)
= q > 1− q
(2.26)
Let Π(b) be the expected payoff of player 4 with i4 = {s4, h4} facing Case (b),
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then:
Π(b) = Pr(s3 = s4, s4 = θ|s1 6= s2) + Pr(s3 6= s4, s4 = θ|s1 6= s2)
=
2q(1− q) · q2
2q(1− q)
+





E[π(d4|i4 = {s4, h4}, y′(i4))] = Pr(a) · Π(a) + Pr(b) · Π(b)
= [q2 + (1− q)2] · [ q
2
q2 + (1− q)2
] + 2q(1− q) · q
= −2q3 + 3q2
= E[π(d4|i4 = h4, y′(i4))]
(2.28)
Given C(i4 = {s4, h4}) > C(i4 = h4), h4  {s4, h4}.
Proposition 2. In the case of costly information acquisition: no private nor so-
cial information is ever acquired if acquisition cost is high; informational cascade
forms and persists with probability 1 for n ≥ 4 if acquisition cost is medium or
low.
Proposition 2 is a summary of Lemma 4 to 7. Figure 2.1 provides a graphical
illustration on the defined high, medium and low cost. Table 2.3 summarises the
predicted information choice and interpretation with high, medium and low cost.
Table 2.4 lists the expected accuracy of each position.
Apart from the case where information is too costly to acquire, Proposition 2
provides a very consistent result with our baseline model that informational cas-
cade forms and persists deterministically. Agents in the cascade do not acquire
private information even the cost is arbitrarily small. Therefore, the classical
social learning models’ idea that social learning is an information interpretation
problem does not apply to reality where information is costly. Instead, in this
paper we propose that social learning is mainly an information acquisition task.
Our model of costly acquisition can be illustrated through a simple example. The
high cost scenario is similar to a decision of choosing from two restaurants for
a quick lunch. The information acquisition cost, in this case, is relatively high
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Figure 2.1: Cost of Information: High, Medium and Low
Note: The horizontal axis stands for the signal quality q ∈ (0.5, 1]. The vertical axis stands for
the acquisition cost C > 0. Given any q, these two curves separate this box into three regions.
The area above the green line represents the high cost situation. The area above the red curve
and below the green line represents the medium cost situation. The area below the red curve
represents the low cost situation.
because the importance of such decision is low. Therefore many people in reality
simply flip a coin instead of acquiring private or social information (examine the
menu, talk with waiters, watch for the decision made by others, etc). Also, the
medium cost scenario is close to a decision of choosing from two restaurants for a
weekend dinner. The decision is more important than the previous case but not
critical. Thus people want to acquire some information either social or private
depending on the circumstance but never both because acquisition cost is still
relatively significant. Finally, the low cost scenario mimics the dining decision
of an important occasion. In such case, although in the long run, people choose
to observe social information only, some people opt to acquire both private and
social information to make better decisions.
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Position Info Choice Info Interpretation
n High Medium Low High Medium Low
1 ∅ s1 s1 rand fol s1 fol s1
2 ∅ s2 s2 rand fol s2 fol s2
3 ∅ s3 {s3, h3} rand fol s3 fol {s3, h3}
4 ∅ h4 h4 rand fol h4 fol h4
≥ 5 ∅ hn hn rand fol hn fol hn
Note: fol stands for an interpretation rule that follows the median of the
observed information with the appreciation of redundancy. Specifically, fol
sn means follow the private signal observed. fol {s3, h3} means follow the
median of {d1, d2, s3}. fol hn means follow the median of {d1, d2, d3} ∀ n.
Table 2.3: A Summary of Information Choice and Interpretation with Acquisition
Cost
Position Expected Accuracy
n High Medium Low
1 1/2 q q
2 1/2 q q
3 1/2 q −2q3 + 3q2(> q)
4 1/2 −2q3 + 3q2(> q) −2q3 + 3q2(> q)
≥ 5 1/2 −2q3 + 3q2(> q) −2q3 + 3q2(> q)
Note: The expected accuracy is calculated given the infor-
mation choice and interpretation listed in Table 2.3.
Table 2.4: A Summary of Expected Accuracy with Acquisition Cost
2.6 Conclusion
This paper presents a new theoretical model that addresses information acquisi-
tion in social learning. Classical social learning models assume that both private
and social information are freely available. In contrast, in the present model
players must first choose which type of information to acquire and then make
a decision based on the observed information. I believe this model serves as a
complement to the classical social learning model since it captures the costly in-
formation acquisition aspect of everyday decisions. Our theoretical framework
provides a clear-cut prediction that starting from the fourth player in a sequence,
information cascades form deterministically, rather than stochastically as in the
classical models. Also, in contrast to the existing social learning models where
asymptotic learning can be achieved through communication channels, we show
that wisdom of the crowds never fully happen because players have no strict
incentives to acquire private information even if it is free.
For behavioural agents, we show that a level-k analysis can capture interesting
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heterogeneity. As argued by Duffy et al. (2017), individuals can be classified
into three groups regarding their attitudes towards social learning. Apart from
rational individuals who learn from other when they should, “lone wolves” are
used to denote the players who are biased against social learning; on the other
hand, “herd animals” are those who are biased to social learning. Specifically
in the present model, L1 players are individualistic lone wolves because they do
not trust predecessors’ rationality. L2 players are naive learners (herd animals)
who neglect the correlation and redundancy in the history. L3 players are those
consistent with equilibrium predictions.
We also extend our baseline model to the environment of costly endogenous ac-
quisition. Our analysis shows that the main result from our baseline model can
capture the costly acquisition situations very well. If information is ever acquired
in the sequence (acquisition cost is not too high), informational cascade forms
deterministically. Also, only if acquisition cost is low enough, both private and
social information are acquired simultaneously, but only once in a sequence. This
result strongly challenges the classical setup where agents make decisions with
access to both private and social information. We test this model experimentally
in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
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Appendices
A Analysis with Assumption 2
In this appendix, we revisit our key results derived in the main body with a
different tie-breaking rule. In contrast to Assumption 1 that agents choose private
information when being indifferent, Assumption 2 (as in Bikhchandani et al.
(1992)) expects agents to behave randomly.
Assumption 2. When a player is indifferent (in terms of expected payoff) be-
tween choosing private information and social information, she chooses private
information with probability 1
2
.
In the following sub-sections in this appendix, we revisit the lemmas, corollaries
and propositions in the main text with Assumption 2.
Rational agents, private/social information are alternatives
Lemma 1
Lemma 1 states that with Assumption 1, no social learning appears when n ≤ 3.
With Assumption 2, clearly Lemma 1 does not hold.
For player 2, she knows EA(h2) = EA(d1) = EA(s1) = q and also EA(s2) = q.
Thus she is indifferent between choosing private and social information in terms
of expected payoff and according to Assumption 2, she chooses social/private




















Therefore player 3 is indifferent between private and social information and thus




Lemma 2 states that with Assumption 1, social learning occurs for sure for n ≥ 4.
We show that Lemma 2 holds with Assumption 2 and the proof is very similar
to the proof for Lemma 2.
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Proof. For the fourth player (player 4), she must choose between h4 = {d1, d2, d3}
and s4. If she chooses to acquire the social information h4, the rational decision
rule would be to follow the median (majority) among {d1, d2 and d3}. We will
show that the accuracy of choosing social information h4 and follow the majority
will be higher than following private signal s4.
There are 4 different cases player 4 may face when choosing social information
h4:
1. all three previous guesses are correct.
2. two out of three previous guesses are correct.
3. one out of three previous guesses are correct.
4. all three previous guesses are false.
Thus only in case 1 and 2, player 4’s guess will be correct if she chooses and
follows social information h4. So we can treat the probability of occurrence of
case 1 and 2 as the expected accuracy of choosing the social information h4 for
player 4.
In case 1, d1, d2, d3 are all correct, thus:
















In case 2 three situations are possible:
a. d1 is correct, d2 is correct, d3 is false, thus:











(1− q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n=3
b. d1 is correct, d2 is false, d3 is correct, thus:















c. d1 is false, d2 is correct, d3 is correct, thus:
















Thus the total expected accuracy of choosing and following h4 is:









q(3 + 3q − 2q2)− q = 1
4
q(1− q)(2q − 1)
Given q ∈ (0.5, 1), this difference EA(h4)−EA(s4) > 0, and thus player 4 chooses
social information h4 and d4 = median of {d1, d2, d3}.
Although the above proof shows that consistent with the main text under As-
sumption 1 that social learning starts for sure at player 4, it should be noted that
information aggregation is even less efficient with Assumption 2. The difference
in social learning information premium between Assumption 1 and Assumption
2 is 7
4
q(1− q)(2q − 1) > 0.
Lemma 3
With Assumption 2, ambiguous social information maybe observed for player 3
since she chooses social information with probability 1
2
. The probability of player
3 observing ambiguous social information (given social information is chosen) is:
Prob(d1 6= d2) = q
1
2
(1− q) + (1− q)1
2
q = q(1− q)
Proposition 3




sn, if n = 1
random, if 2 ≤ n ≤ 3
hn, if n ≥ 4
(29)
PBNE information interpretation y∗(in) can be characterised as
14:
13random stands for choosing private/social information with probability 12 .
14follow stands for following the information she chooses. Thus if her random choice of
information is indeed sn, she follows the private signal; and follows hn if otherwise. When hn









follow, if i∗n = random
median of {d1, d2, d3}, if i∗n = hn
(30)
Corollary 1
Corollary 1 holds with Assumption 2 since limn→∞ Pr(dn = θ) =
1
4
q(3 + 3q −
2q2) < 1.
Corollary 2
Corollary 2 no longer holds with Assumption 2. Instead, when agents in the cas-
cade are uncertain about the relationship between previous actions and previous
private signals, agents have a positive willingness to pay for additional private
signal.
Proof. Corollary 2 shows that for n ≥ 4, who are in the informational cascade,
do not have strict incentive to acquire private information after observing social
information. Let ε > 0 be the cost of acquiring private information; the following
proof shows that for any positive value of ε, player 4 does not acquire private
information in equilibrium.
If the following equation holds, player 4 will acquire an additional private signal.
Otherwise, she does not acquire private information.
Pr(d4 = θ|s1, d2, d3, s4)− ε ≥ Pr(d4 = θ|s1, d2, d3) (31)
Following the same rule in the proof of lemma 1 and 2 in this appendix, the
expected accuracy of LHS equation can be represented as:
Pr(1, 1, 1) + q[Pr(1, 1, 0) + Pr(1, 0, 1) + Pr(1, 0, 0)
+Pr(0, 0, 1) + Pr(0, 1, 1) + Pr(0, 1, 0)]− ε
(32)
The basic idea behind the above equation is, as player 4 cannot perfectly predict
whether the actions of player 2 and player 3 are results of their independent
private signal, she relies on her own private signal when there exists a tie (if
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{d1, d2, d3, s4} is bimodal). Simplified to get:
1
4
q(1 + 9q − 6q2)− ε (33)





q(1 + 9q − 6q2)− 1
4
q(3 + 3q − 2q2)
≤ 1
2




q(q − 1)(2q − 1) > 0 for q ∈ (0.5, 1). Therefore, agents in the cascade
have positive incentive to acquire additional private information.
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CHAPTER 3 INFORMATION CHOICE IN A SE-
QUENTIAL SOCIAL LEARNING EX-
PERIMENT
3.1 Introduction
People often learn by observing the behaviour of others. The analysis of social
learning in economics has grown since the two seminal papers on this topic by
Bikhchandani et al. (1992) and Banerjee (1992). While many non-economists
might interpret the observation of individuals following the actions of others as
evidence of conformism, the insight of this theoretical literature is that apparent
herd behaviour can be a rational response to the information contained in the
actions of others. Still, a remaining unanswered question is precisely how much
imitative behaviour can be explained by purely rational motives and how much
may be due to individual bias toward social information.
Laboratory evidence on sequential social learning was first provided by Anderson
& Holt (1997), and their design has become a baseline model for later researchers
(see Anderson & Holt (2008) for a survey). It employs a sequential structure,
where a sequence of subjects have to guess the true state of the world, observ-
ing both an informative private signal and the guesses of the subjects prior to
them in the sequence. Since then, many replications and modifications to this
experimental design have been studied and reported (see for example Willinger
& Ziegelmeyer (1998); Hung & Plott (2001); Nöth & Weber (2003); Goeree et al.
(2007)). Recently, Weizsäcker (2010) combined 13 studies containing this base-
line experimental design with the help of meta-analysis to conclude that people,
in general, tend to overweight their private information and thus underweight
social information. In other words, people often fail to learn from others when
they should, due to a bias towards using private information.
In this paper, we examine the robustness of this bias toward private information
by modifying the classical social learning experiments. In their design, subjects
are presented with both social information about the prior guesses of others re-
garding the true state of the world and private information about the true state
of the world in the form of a noisy but informative signal. They must then guess
the true state. By contrast, in our new experimental design, subjects in our ex-
periment move sequentially (as in Anderson and Holt) but there is an additional
stage to each subject’s decision. In the first stage, subjects must make a choice
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between viewing social information (the guesses of others prior to them in the se-
quence) or receiving a noisy but informative private signal. They do not see both.
In the second stage, after viewing the information they chose to receive, subjects
must guess the true state of the world, just as in Anderson and Holt. Further-
more, each subject participates in several different sequences, making decisions
in different locations in the sequence.
Our experimental design is motivated by several advantages over the classical
sequential social learning design. First, by adding this additional choice stage
to each subject’s decision and require subjects to make such decisions multi-
ple times in different positions, we make within-subject analysis possible. With
within-subject design, individual bias for or against social information can be
identified and explained by personal characteristics.1 Second, such a design al-
lows for more detailed and efficient identification of mistakes made by subjects.
For example, we observe cases where a subject chooses to see private informa-
tion but then (sub-optimally) does not follow it. In the standard social learning
design, individual mistakes can only be identified when both social and private
information agree and yet the subject chooses differently. Third, our design re-
lates more closely to reality where information is usually costly. Compared with
the classical setup in which both private and social information are available, our
design accounts for the fact that information acquisition is usually costly, and
thus before making the final decision, agents might first decide what information
to acquire. Thus, arguably having to choose which information to see is more re-
alistic than having both freely available in many real world situations. Finally, by
requiring subjects to choose between social and private information (rather than
giving both types of information to subjects), a potential experimenter demand
effect can be eliminated. As suggested by Cooper & Rege (2011), giving subjects
their own private information might suggest that it should be used or weighted
more heavily. The above advantages are key motivations for our novel design.
Furthermore, we run a treatment involving a sequence of four subjects, labelled
“Group”, and contrast that with a treatment involving a sequence of just two
subjects, labelled “Pair”. This allows us to further test whether “pro-social” effi-
ciency considerations affect the choice of private information. That is, a subject
placed second in a sequence of four subjects might choose private information
to improve the information content of social information for subsequent players,
1Classical sequential social learning experiments are all based on a between-subject design.
This is because a within-subject design is impractical as the content of the social information
is endogenous and thus not under the control of the experimenter.
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but in a group of two, a subject should not have such motivations. While Engel-
mann & Strobel (2004) identify efficiency concerns in distribution experiments,
efficiency in information provision has not been considered by the previous studies
of social learning.
To preview our main findings, we find that most subjects choose information ra-
tionally, depending on their position in the sequence, but we also find significant
and approximately equal fractions of subjects who are biased toward private or
toward social information. Thus our results challenge the previous finding from
information use analysis Weizsäcker (2010) that subjects overweight private in-
formation. Second, by comparing subjects’ behaviour in intermediate positions
and in final positions, we find that subjects tend to choose and reveal private
information more when their decisions can be observed by others later in the
sequence. Therefore the bias towards private information identified in previous
studies might be better explained by pro-social, efficiency considerations, rather
than by cognitive limitations or an experimenter demand effects. Third, subjects
start choosing social information earlier in the Group treatment than is optimal,
which is likely owing to their neglect of the possibility of “ties” in the private
information received by earlier subjects in the sequence, thereby rendering social
information useless. This tie neglect explains some of the bias we find toward
social information. Fourth, we find that mistakes in information usage are also
quite common, with approximately two thirds of subjects making guesses that
are opposite to the information they chose to view at least once during the ex-
periment. This finding further challenges the validity of classical social learning
experiments where confusing actions or mistakes cannot be so clearly identified.
Fifth, we find that cognitive reflection test (CRT) scores help to explain the
heterogeneity in subjects’ decisions rather well. In general, subjects with better
reflective cognitive ability (higher CRT scores) choose optimal information more
frequently and follow information more frequently. Finally, jointly with cognitive
ability, we find subjects’ individual traits (as identified by a post-experimental
survey) and programme major can predict social learning behaviour.
Related to our experimental design, Kübler & Weizsäcker (2004) modify the An-
derson and Holt design to introduce a cost for private signals. In their experiment,
social information is available by default and free, however, agents have to decide
whether or not to obtain a private signal at a small cost. In equilibrium, only the
first player will buy the signal and all the rest imitate the first decision maker. In
their experiment, however, too many private signals are bought by the subjects.
35
They conclude that this is due to the fact that subjects’ depth of reasoning is
very limited. However, in their model, errors can only be made in one direction
and thus biases in favor of social information cannot be observed.
Goeree & Yariv (2015) designed an experiment aiming to disentangle information-
based herding from an intrinsic taste for conformity. In their experiment, before
making a decision, subjects face a choice between an informative private signal
and the history actions of predecessors who have not chosen a private signal
(word-of-mouth information). In equilibrium, nobody will choose this type of
social information since it is uninformative. However, Goeree & Yariv (2015)
find that approximately 1/3 of the information choices in their experiment are
social, and conclude that for many people, herding might be a rule of thumb,
rationalizing this overweighting of social information.
Importantly, private information is always strictly optimal in Goeree & Yariv
(2015), and thus, there, errors can only run in one direction - towards social
information. Furthermore, the long sequences employed in the existing social
learning literature, including Weizsäcker (2010), leading to errors running again
only in one, though opposite, direction - towards private information. In contrast,
in our setup, either social or private information can be optimal depending on
the situation, allowing for errors in either direction. If anything, our overall
design slightly favours mistakes towards social information (when compared to
equilibrium predictions).
Related to our work, De Filippis et al. (2016) modify the Anderson and Holt
setup by adding a belief elicitation stage after subjects observe the decisions of
others and once again after they have received their own private signal. This
design enables them to assess the extent to which subjects update their beliefs,
conditional on each type of information received. They report that when the
private signal confirms the subjects’ first belief, they weight it according to Bayes
rule, but when it contradicts their first belief, they overweight it, relative to
Bayesian updating. Thus, their evidence also points to an overweighting of private
information, which arises from the asymmetric manner in which agents update
beliefs.
Finally, Duffy et al. (2017) also study subjects’ choice of social or private informa-
tion in an experiment where the aim is to guess the true state of the world. How-
ever, in their design, subjects do not move sequentially as in the standard social
learning experiments. Instead, subjects have to simultaneously decide whether
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to use social or private information, the optimality of which depends on the per-
sistence of the state which can change from one period to the next. As in this
paper, they find that most subjects choose information rationally, those there
exists a sizable and approximately equal fraction of subjects who have a clear
bias for social or for private information. They label those with a bias for social
information “herd animals” and those with a bias for private information “lone
wolves,” and we adopt this same labelling to describe types in this experiment as
well.
3.2 Model and Theoretical Predictions
3.2.1 Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
See Chapter 2 for details. In short, PBNE predicts that private information
should be chosen in positions 2 and 3, but social information should be chosen
from position 4 on-wards.
3.2.2 Logit Quantal Response Equilibrium Predictions
An alternative theoretical framework is Logit Quantal Response Equilibrium
(LQRE) (McKelvey & Palfrey, 1995). LQRE has two main advantages. First,
LQRE takes the widely observed “trembling hand” behaviour into consideration
and the level of tremble can be calibrated from real experimental data. In addi-
tion, instead of a sharp 1 or 0 strategy prediction from PBNE, LQRE generates
predictions in terms of frequencies which are usually closer to real data.
Given the binary setup of our experiment, there are four potential strategies.
We write pf to denote choosing private information and following it, and pn to
denote choosing private information but guessing that the state of the world is
the opposite. We note that when a subject is in position 3, the guesses of the two
previous subjects might differ, resulting in an ambiguous information “tie”. We
thus write sf to denote choosing social information and following the majority
when in position 4, and following the subject in position 1 otherwise.2 Finally,
sn denotes choosing social information and guessing the opposite of sf .
We normalise the payoffs to correct and incorrect guesses to 1 and 0, respectively;
and assume the utility function, u(·) for each player is linear. Player’s rationality
2When subjects have trembling hands, a subject at position 2 is less likely to be correct
compared to a subject at position 1, as position 2 allows for an additional strategy of misusing
social information.
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is captured by the parameter µ with 0 < µ < ∞: the higher µ is, the more
rational playeri is.
The first player in the sequence faces only two options, to follow private signal






All subsequent players in the sequence face all four strategies, and thus the LQRE
probability of following the private signal is:
prob(pf)n =
eµ·u(pf)n
eµ·u(pf)n + eµ·u(pn)n + eµ·u(sf)n + eµ·u(sn)n
,∀n ≥ 2 (3.2)
In general, the predictions of LQRE depend on the value of µ, the precision
parameter. For players in positions 2 and 3, the qualitatively robust prediction
is that they choose private information more frequently than social, as mistakes
by prior players reduce the expected accuracy of social information. However, at
position 4, the value of µ does matter for determining the modal strategy choice.
If µ is sufficiently low, then play is noisy enough to render social information, even
in position 4, to be less accurate than private. Since play frequencies in LQRE
reflect relative payoffs, this induces the LQRE to place greater probability on pf
than sf in position 4 if µ is below some threshold value µ̂. One can calculate
that for µ < µ̂ = 8.42, the modal action is to choose private information.
3.3 Experimental Design
The experiment consists of two main parts, and subjects were informed of the
content of each part only at the beginning of that part. Specifically, at the be-
ginning of the experiment, subjects were given written instructions for the first
part. After these instructions were read aloud to ensure that these instructions
were common knowledge, subjects completed a comprehension quiz to verify their
understanding of these experimental instructions, before moving to making de-
cisions in the first part. After the first part was completed, the experiment was
paused, and subjects were handed out the written instructions for the second
part, which were also read aloud, and were also followed by a comprehension
quiz, before moving to making decisions in the second part.3.
At the beginning of each experimental session, all subjects were randomly and
3Instructions used in the experiment are available upon request.
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anonymously divided into groupings of four subjects, which stayed fixed for the
duration of the experiment. Then each subject made decisions in two formations,
a 4-subject “Group” (G) formation, and a 2-subject “Pair” (P) formation (involv-
ing a further random division of the four subject grouping into two fixed pairs).
Apart from the formation size, the decision-making tasks and the environment of
the “Group” and the “Pair” formations are identical.
At the beginning of each round, subjects are arranged in a randomly determined
sequential order within their formation (i.e. a 4-subject “group” or a 2-subject
“pair”). For each formation, nature draws one of the two urns, A and B, with
commonly known equal chance, and this urn will determine the state of the world
for all subjects in a given formation (which we will refer as to the formation urn).
Of the three balls in urn A, two are labelled a and one is labelled b. Urn B,
analogously, has two labelled b and one labelled a.
Subjects are asked one by one, according to their position in the sequence, to
provide their individually incentivised guess which urn is chosen by the nature
as their group (pair) urn. Before making their guess, the first subject in a given
sequence is revealed their independent private signal of the state, in the form of a
ball drawn (with replacement) from the formation urn. Each subsequent subject
in a given sequence, prior to making their guess, have to choose to observe either
1) a private signal, in the form of a ball drawn (with replacement) from the group
(pair) urn; or 2) social information, in the form of the urn guesses made by all
previous subjects in the sequence.
After all decisions in a round are made, the group (pair) urn is revealed. Each
subject is paid a fixed payment of £5 if her urn guess coincides with the group
(pair) urn in a randomly selected round, and nothing otherwise. As a feedback,
subjects were revealed history of actual urns, their urn guesses, the type of infor-
mation they selected, and the content of both private and social information (i.e.
both information they selected to see as well as the information not selected).
However, subjects do not observe neither the others’ private signals nor their
information selections neither during nor after the experiment.
Subjects were informed that they would experience each position in the sequence
exactly 6 times, but their position in a particular round will be randomly de-
termined. Thus, they faced 24 rounds of the “Group” formation and 12 rounds
of the “Pair” formation. To control for the potential order effect, we conducted
two treatments, the “Group-Pair” treatment (GP) and the reversed order “Pair-
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Group” treatment (PG). Specifically, in PG treatment, in the first part of the
experiment, subjects made decisions in the “Pair” formation, followed by making
decisions in the “Group” formation of the second part. In the GP treatment, the
order of the two parts is reversed.4
After these two main parts of the experiment, the experimenter invited two vol-
unteers from the subjects to roll physical dice to randomly select two rounds
from the “Group” part and one round from the “Pair” part for real payment - so
that each round of the experiment had an equal, 1/12 chance of being selected
for payment. In the third part, subjects were offered a fixed payment of £3
for completing the demographic information, Cognitive Reflection Test Frederick
(2005), and further questions designed to identify individual differences. Finally,
subjects were invited to submit open-ended comments on their decisions in the
experiment.
The experiment was conducted in eight 16-subject sessions at the Behavioural
Laboratory at the University of Edinburgh (BLUE), using the software z-Tree
(see, Fischbacher, 2007). The participants were randomly recruited by BLUE
recruitment system and most were students at the University of Edinburgh.
Table 3.1 presents a summary of the two treatments.
GP treatment PG treatment
No. Sessions 4 4
Ave. Duration 103min 105min
No. Subjects per Session 16 16
No. Info Choices 18+6=24 6+18=24
No. Urn Guesses 24+12=36 12+24=36
Ave. Earningsa £17.30 £18.23
Total No. Subjects 64 64
a Includes £5 show-up fee and £3 reward for completing survey.
Table 3.1: Summary of Treatments
3.4 Experimental Results: Between Subject
In this section, we focus on our two main questions: which information was
chosen and whether the chosen information was used optimally. In particular,
we are interested in whether subjects systematically choose and follow private
information when it is suboptimal to do so. First, note that there are no payoff-
4We found no systematic order effect - see Appendix A.
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relevant motives to go against the chosen information, or not to comply with the
information. Thus, an important measure of optimality of subjects’ choices is
information compliance, or the rate of optimal use of the available information.
In what follows, we will use P1 and P2 to represent subjects in positions 1 and 2,
respectively, in the Pair formation and G1-G4 to represent subjects in positions
1-4, respectively, in the Group formation.
3.4.1 Overview of Information Choice and Compliance
The aggregate statistics of subjects’ behaviour is presented in Table 3.2. The first
two columns give the frequency with which private and social information were
chosen by subjects of different positions.
First, it is clear that there is a trend towards choosing social information at later
positions in the sequence. In particular, social information is most frequently
chosen at position G4, with subjects choosing social information in about 83.6%
of the cases. Interestingly, the majority of subjects switch to choosing social
information at position 3. Finally, if we compare the information choices of G2
and G4, biases/mistakes are of the same size for either when private or social
information is optimal.
Formation Position Private Social % pf % pn % sf % sn
“Pair” P1 n/a n/a 90.8 9.2 n/a n/a
P2 72.4 27.6 66.3 6.1 24.4 3.3
“Group” G1 n/a n/a 91.8 8.2 n/a n/a
G2 82.8 17.2 77.1 5.7 15.5 1.8
G3 40.9 59.1 37.6 3.3 48.7a 10.4a
G4 16.4 83.6 14.2 2.2 77.3 6.3
a Out of a total of 768 observations at G3, social information chosen 454 times, and was
unambiguous (i.e. G1G2) in 284 observations. Among the remaining 170 cases when it was
“tied” (i.e. G1 6= G2), 62.4% of G3 guesses coincided with G1 guesses, and thus were inter-
preted as sf; and 37.6% of G3 guesses coincided with G2 guesses, contradicting G1 guesses,
thus were interpreted as sn.
Table 3.2: Summary of Information Choice and Compliance by Position
The remaining columns in Table 3.2 show the distribution of the four strategies
(pf - choose private and follow it; pn - choose private and do not follow; sf -
choose social info and follow it (i.e. follow the majority if in position 4, or follow
subject in position 1 otherwise); sn - choose social info and do not follow it)
adopted by our subjects at different positions. The compliance rate, or the fre-
quency with which subjects follow their chosen information (which is equal to the
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sum of %pf and %sf) exceeds 90% at each position, except for the complex case
of position G3. Notably, there is no difference in compliance rate between private
information and social information (see the details in Table A.2 in Appendix A),
suggesting that the confusion/mistakes affecting information compliance might
be due to some process which is independent of the source of information.
In short, the earlier documented bias towards private information (see,
Weizsäcker, 2010) is not supported by our data. First, information choices roughly
approximate the PBNE theoretical predictions suggesting that subjects success-
fully choose social information when they should. Second, the biggest deviation
from the equilibrium predictions is towards social information, not private, in
position 3. Third, when it comes down to compliance rates, subjects do not
discriminate between private and social information.
Finding 1. There is no systematic bias towards either private or social informa-
tion in our social learning experiment.
3.4.2 LQRE Calibrations
In general, the frequencies with which strategies are chosen in LQRE depend
on the precision parameter µ. We can estimate an appropriate value for µ
using behaviour in position 1, by using the empirical average compliance rate
(across both formations) at position 1 of 91.3% from Table 3.2. By substitut-
ing prob(pf)1 = 0.913 into equation (3.1), and solving it, we obtain µ = 7.05.
We then substitute the value of µ = 7.05 into equation (3.2) to calculate choice
probabilities for different values of n.
As Table 3.3 shows, strategy pf (choose private information and follow it) emerges
as the most frequent strategy at all positions. Importantly, LQRE prediction
coincides with PBNE, except at position G4. As noted in Section 3.2.2, if the
precision parameter µ is below the threshold value µ̂ = 8.42, then play in the
LQRE would be so noisy that the expected return to social information at position
G4 would be lower than expected return to private information. As our calibrated
value of µ = 7.05 is below µ̂, the predicted frequency of pf is greater than that
of sf at position G4 - in clear contrast to the PBNE (and also to the empirical
findings of Table 3.2). Yet, LQRE predictions are not sharp at position 4 - pf
and sf are predicted to have similar frequencies as the expected payoffs of these
two strategies are close. Finally, note that LQRE does not fit our experimental
data very well. Not only if fails to predict the large majority choosing social
information at position 4 and following, it also does not predict the high frequency
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Position PBNE LQRE (µ = 7.05) Empirically Optimal
G1/P1 private (pf) prob(pf) = 0.913 private (pf)
G2/P2 private (pf) prob(pf) = 0.493 > prob(sf) = 0.402 private (pf)
G3 private (pf) prob(pf) = 0.493 > prob(sf) = 0.402 private (pf)
G4 social (sf) prob(pf) = 0.471 > prob(sf) = 0.435 social (sf)
Table 3.3: Theoretical Predictions
of choice of social information in position G3. To be fair, this later “tie neglect”
effect is also not picked up by PBNE, as both PBNE and LQRE predict identical
strategic behaviour at G2 and G3.
3.4.3 Empirically Optimal Strategy
Weizsäcker (2010) suggests that one should also consider the empirically optimal
strategies that reflect the true behaviour (rationality) of other players. That is, we
should expect a rational subject to optimize with respect to the actual behaviour
of his opponents rather than some idealized equilibrium. The empirically optimal
action for our experiment is presented in the last column of Table 3.3. This
result is calculated using the empirical data of Table 3.2. The presence of non-
compliance is enough to make private information optimal at positions 2 and 3,
but still compliance is high enough so that social information is still optimal at
position 4. Thus, the empirically optimal strategy is the same as PBNE.
3.5 Experimental Results: Within Subject
Our within-subject design allows to compare individual subject behaviour at dif-
ferent positions in the sequence. We thus are interested in whether individual
subject behaviour is consistent with the theoretical predictions of Table 3.3. We
also are interested in documenting possible deviations from payoff-maximizing
behaviour. The empirically optimal choice involves choosing social information
in position G4, and following the majority of guesses, and thus a choice of private
information in G4 would indicate a bias towards private information. One can
observe further biases for a particular type of information by comparing subjects’
choices in position G3 to choices in positions P2 and G2. Furthermore, if subjects
have any additional efficiency or other-regarding preferences, one should observe
further differences in behaviour in positions P2 and G2, as P2 is a final position
in the sequence, while G2 is followed by two more subjects.
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3.5.1 Efficiency Concerns: Information Choices at G2 vs. P2
As Banerjee (1992) pointed out, following others in a sequential learning setup
can generate a negative herding externality, reducing social welfare. Hung & Plott
(2001) find that when standards payoffs are replaced by majority rule, cascades
form significantly less. Thus, it is plausible that subjects can identify such a
herding externality on followers, and may be able to avoid herding for payoff or
efficiency purposes. Furthermore, Engelmann & Strobel (2004) document, albeit
in a different context, that some subjects may have efficiency concerns, desiring
to maximise the sum of participants’ payoffs.
We thus hypothesise that subjects with efficiency concerns may choose and reveal
private information more frequently when their decision may affect the welfare
of others. Specifically, we note that a subject in position 2 is a “terminal” player
in the “Pair” formation, but is followed by two more subjects in the “Group”
formation. Thus, if efficiency concerns exist, and subjects are able to identify the
negative externality of choosing social information, they would choose private
information more frequently in the position G2 than in the position P2. Indeed,
by revealing private information at position G2, one can potentially improve the
success rate of the follower at position G4 by 10.3% (see Chapter 2).
We find that when placed at position 2 in a sequence, the same subjects choose
private information significantly more frequently at position G2 in “Group” for-
mation than at position P2 in “Pair” formation (82.81% vs. 72.39%, Wilcoxon
signed-rank test p < 0.01). This can be further observed in Figure 3.1 which
depicts the number of private information choices by each subject in positions
P2 and G2. In the absence of efficiency concerns, observations would be located
symmetrically around the 45◦ line. The observations located above the 45◦ line
indicate potential efficiency concerns, as these subjects choose private information
more frequently at G2 than P2.
Finding 2. Subjects choose private information more frequently when they are
followed by others in the sequence, indicating a possibility of efficiency concerns.
3.5.2 Tie Neglect: Information Choices at G3
Perhaps, the most surprising theoretical prediction of PBNE in Section 3.2.1 is
that the optimal strategy at position G3 is to select private information and
follow it. This result runs counter to the intuition that two equally precise in-
dependent pieces of information are more informative than only one piece of the
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Figure 3.1: Efficiency Concerns: Private Information Choices at G2 vs. P2
Number of private information choices at G2 (y-axis) and P2 (x-axis), for each of 128 subjects.
The size of the bubbles is proportional to the number of subjects with a given (x, y) value. This
frequency is also stated within the bubble. The bubbles located above the 45◦ line indicate
potential efficiency concerns.
same precision. Indeed, as in PBNE each player follows their information, social
information at position G3 in the form of guesses at G1 and G2 is more accu-
rate - but only when these guesses coincide. However, when they contradict (or
“tie”), social information at G3 is noninformative. And, the expected frequency
of the tie is sufficiently high to offset the informational advantages of coincident
guesses. Such tie neglect, which is ignoring or underestimating the possibility
of observing uninformative social information due to a “tie” can only happen in
odd positions like G3, G5, and so on, where social information consists of even
number of previous actions.
Indeed, a substantial number of subjects exhibit tie-neglect behaviour as they
choose social information more frequently at position G3 than at positions G2 or
P2. As Figure 3.3 demonstrates, the frequency of private information choice at
G3 is significantly lower than that at positions P2 and G2 (Wilcoxon signed-rank
test p < 0.01 for both comparisons). Specifically, in Figure 3.3 (left panel), more
observations are located below 45◦ line, suggesting more subjects choosing private
information less frequently (and thus choose social information more frequently)
at position G3 compared to their terminal position P2 in the “Pair” formation. As
Figure 3.3 (right panel) demonstrates, the tie neglect is even more pronounced
when efficiency concerns are potentially at play, as even more subjects chose
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Figure 3.2: Tie Neglect: Private Information Choices at G3 vs. P2 (G2)
Number of private information choices at G3 (y-axis) versus at P2 (x-axis in the left panel) and
G2 (x-axis in the right panel), for each of 128 subjects. The size of the bubbles is proportional
to the number of subjects with a given (x, y) value. This frequency is also stated within the
bubble. The bubbles located above the 45◦ line indicate potential “tie neglect”.
social information more frequently at position G3 than when they were followed
by the others in position G2 in the “Group” formation. That is, despite efficiency
concerns potentially being at play both in positions G2 and G3, the tie neglect
effect appears to be stronger than the efficiency-concerns effect.
We are not aware of any previous literature explicitly discussing and/or docu-
menting this phenomenon.5 The tie neglect identified here is different from the
redundancy neglect documented by Eyster & Rabin (2014). Redundancy ne-
glecting subjects sub-optimally overweight social information because they fail
to recognize the correlation inherent in prior actions. While this correlation is
also potentially relevant in our setup, tie neglect arises from ignoring a possibility
of uninformative “anti-correlated” signals. Without tie neglect, both PBNE and
LQRE predict that the frequency of private information choice at G2 and G3
should be equal regardless of the level of redundancy neglect.
Finding 3. Subjects choose social information more frequently at position G3
than at positions G2 and P2, indicating a possibility of “tie neglect”.
5The indirectly relevant literature includes bounded rationality (Simon, 1982; Kahneman,
2003), subjective probability (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972), unawareness (Dekel et al., 1998;
Modica & Rustichini, 1999; Heifetz et al., 2006) and two-heads-better-than-one (Cooper &
Kagel, 2005).
46
Figure 3.3: Tie Neglect: Private Information Choices at G3 vs. P2/G2
Each dot represents each of the 128 subjects’ choices of private information at G3 (y-axis)
versus at P2 (x-axis in the left panel) and G2 (x-axis in the right panel).
3.5.3 Optimality: Information Choices at G4 vs. P2 and G2
We are now ready to explore the degree of optimality of subjects’ choice of infor-
mation. Both PBNE and LQRE predict that the frequency of private information
choice at G4 should be lower than at P2, G2, and G3. As we discussed earlier,
subjects might be liable to social information bias at position G3 due to “tie ne-
glect”, and to private information bias at position G2 due to efficiency concerns.
Thus, a pair of numbers representing each subject’s choices of private information
at the terminal positions G4 and P2 provides a reasonable insights into subjects’
abilities to select information optimally.
Figure 3.4 (left panel) plots the information choice at G4 versus P2, and suggests
an interesting pattern of choices. Note that there is a big cluster of subjects at the
bottom right corner around the coordinate (6,0). These subjects behave according
to the refined PBNE, and choose always private information at P2 and social
information at G4. There are also two smaller clusters which are more difficult
to explain using existing theories. The cluster at the bottom left corner, around
the coordinate (0,0), represents subjects who always choose social information,
and whose behaviour is consistent with both theories at position G4 but not at
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Figure 3.4: Optimality: Private Information Choices at G4 vs. P2 and G2
Number of private information choices at G4 (y-axis) versus at P2 (x-axis in the left panel) and
G2 (x-axis in the right panel), for each of 128 subjects. The size of the bubbles is proportional
to the number of subjects with a given (x, y) value. This frequency is also stated within the
bubble. The bubbles located above the 45◦ line indicate tendency for optimal information
choice.
position P2. The cluster at the top right corner, around the coordinate (6,6),
represents subjects who always choose private information, and whose behaviour
is consistent with both theories at position P2 but not at position G4. These two
extreme clusters of “herd animals” (those who always choose social information)
and “lone wolves” (those who always choose private information) were also found
earlier in Duffy et al. (2017). Furthermore, while the combination of private
information choices at positions G4 and G2 is a noisier indicator of subject’s
optimality because of potential efficiency concerns, nevertheless Figure 3.4 (right
panel) presents the very similar result.
Finding 4. A majority of subjects behave according to the refined PBNE, but
there are also some “herd animals” and “lone wolves”.
3.5.4 Lone Wolf Index (LWI)
As we reported earlier in Finding 1, aggregate data from our experiment does not
indicate any systematic bias. However, as Finding 4 states, there is substantial
heterogeneity in subjects’ tendencies to choose information optimally. While a
majority of subjects appear to be able to optimally select information, there are
also substantial number of subjects who select information optimally in some
positions, but not in others.
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To separate subjects’ biases from their optimal decisions, we follow Duffy et al.
(2017) and calculate a Lone Wolf Index (LWI) for each subject. This is defined
as the total number of private information choices at the positions P2 and G4,
less 6, so that LWI ranges from -6 to 6. If a subject always chooses information
optimally, she selects private information 6 times at P2 and 0 times at G4, so
that her LWI equals to 0, and thus she is unbiased. In contrast, if she always
chooses private information, her LWI would be 6, a biased lone wolf. Analogously,
her LWI would be -6 if she always chooses social information (and never private
information), a biased herd animal.
The distribution of LWI is presented in the left panel of Figure 3.5. The median
and modal subject is unbiased with LWI of zero, and thus either chooses the
information optimally, or makes equal number of suboptimal decisions in both
positions. The mean of LWI is -0.67, which is significantly different from 0 (two-
tailed t-test, p = 0.016), suggesting that our subjects are slightly biased towards
social information. A test for skewness and kurtosis gives Pr(Skewness) = 0.329
and Pr(Kurtosis) = 0.784, with adjusted χ2(2) = 1.04 (p = 0.594), suggesting
symmetry around the mean.
We also consider a version of the Lone Wolf Index which taking into account
efficiency concerns, by calculating the total number of private information choices
at the positions G2 and G4, less 6. As one can see in the right panel of Figure 3.5,
the distribution of this version of LWI is effectively unbiased, with a mean of -
0.05 that is not significantly different from zero (two-tailed t-test, p = 0.856), and
appears to be symmetric around the median and mode of zero. A test for skewness
and kurtosis gives Pr(Skewness) = 0.544 and Pr(Kurtosis) = 0.198, with adjusted
χ2(2) = 2.07 (p = 0.356). This suggests that, among our subjects, efficiency
concerns offset the above-mentioned slight bias towards social information.
Finding 5. A substantial number of subjects chose information optimally. Over-
all there is a slight bias towards choosing social information, which is offset by
efficiency concerns.
3.5.5 Total Private Information Index (TPI)
We further explore subject heterogeneity in information choice by considering all
situations where subjects were confronted with information selection task. There
were total of 24 such situations: 6 situations in “Pair” formation when subjects
were in position P2, and 18 situations in “Group” formation when subjects were
in positions G2-G4). Note that subjects’ choices at position G3 appear to be
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Figure 3.5: Lone Wolf Index
Distributions of the Lone Wolf Index (LWI), a measure of bias towards private information,
which is a sum of subject’s private information choices at G4 and P2 (G2) minus 6. It ranges
from -6 to 6, with negative (positive) values indicating a bias towards social (private) infor-
mation. (N of subjects = 128.) Left panel: LWI is a number of subject’s private information
choices at G4 and P2 (i.e. terminal positions), minus 6. Right panel: a version of LWI cal-
culated as a number of subject’s private information choices at G4 and G2 (i.e. potentially
affected by efficiency concerns), minus 6.
affected by a particular failure of cognition, the “tie neglect” effect. We thus will
treat the choices in that position with caution, and, to disentangle the effect of
tie neglect, will also look at subjects’ behaviour excluding their choices at G3.
We first generate a Total Private Information index (TPI), which is the number
of all situations where a given subject selected private information out of 24 sit-
uations. Thus, TPI ranges from 0 to 24, with 0 representing subjects who never
choose private information during the entire experiment, and 24 representing sub-
jects who always choose private information. We also consider the total number
of private information choices without a possibility of tie neglect, by considering
all information choice situations except those at position G3 - so that in this case
the range is 0 to 18. Figure 3.6 depicts the distribution of TPI including and
excluding position G3 (left and right panels, respectively).
Concentrating on the left panel of Figure 3.6, it appears that no single behavioural
model can explain the distribution of TPI, as it is widely spread with multiple
spikes. At the left corner, there are a small group of subjects, who never or almost
never choose private information (herd animals). At the opposite corner, there are
a few subjects who almost always choose private information regardless of their
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Figure 3.6: Distributions of Total No. of Private Information Choices (TPI) With
and Without Tie Neglect
The Total Private Information index (TPI) is the number of situations were a given subject se-
lected private information. Subjects who always choose private (social) information are located
on the right- (left-) hand side of the range. Left panel: TPI is based on information choices
at all positions (P2, G2, G3, and G4), and ranges from 0 to 24. Right panel: TPI calculated
without tie neglect, for information choices only at positions P2, G2, and G4, and ranges from
0 to 18.
position (lone wolves). There are also clear spikes at 12 and 18. At 12, most are
subjects choosing private information at position 2 in both “Pair” and “Group”
formations, and switching to social information at position G4 (optimal) as well
as at position G3 (tie neglect). At 18, most are subjects who switch to social
information only at position G4, corresponding to PBNE and empirically opti-
mal strategies. The presence of observations with other values of the TPI index
indicate that many subjects are not “pure” in terms of their information choices,
some of them are either updating their strategies during the experiment, or do
not have stable strategies. Overall, the mean TPI of 12.75 is marginally greater
than median and modal value of 12 (one-tailed t-test, p = 0.077), suggesting a
strong presence of tie neglect, and a substantial presence of optimality.
The left panel of Figure 3.6 excludes the confusing position G3, and shows that,
once one excludes the possibility of tie neglect, the modal response is optimal, with
each subject choosing private information 12 times (mostly at positions P2 and
G2). The distribution of total number of private information choices excluding G3
is strongly skewed towards social information with skewness of -.467 (p = 0.03),
with mean of 10.30, and median at 11. Given our experimental design involving
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short sequences, one would expect such negative skewness, - which is the exact
opposite of the what one would expect in an experimental design with longer
sequences, such as the standard social learning experiments.
Finding 6. There is substantial individual heterogeneity in information choice.
A large group of subjects exhibited tie neglect. Once a possibility of tie neglect is
excluded, optimality emerges as the most prominent behaviour, with some “lone
wolves” and “herd animals”.
3.5.6 Information Optimality vs. Bias
Similarly to the above mentioned Total Private Information index (TPI), one
can construct a Total Optimal Information index (TOI) by adding the number
of times a particular subject chooses private information in positions P2, G2,
and G3, with the number of times she chooses social information in position G4.
Theoretically, TOI ranges from 0 to 24 (with 0 representing a theoretical agent
who chooses the opposite of optimal information in all 24 choice situations), but
its empirical range is from 6 to 24, with mean of 16.78 and standard deviation
of 4.44. However, on its own, such optimality index is less interesting than its
combination with a measure of bias.
In order to consider each subject’s information optimality jointly with her in-
formation bias, we first, for each subject, convert the Total Optimal Information
index (TOI) into the proportion of all information choices which were optimal (as
a measure of total rationality), as well as convert the Total Private Information
index (TPI) into the proportion of all information choices which were private (as
a measure of total bias). Figure 3.7 represents the joint distribution of these two
numbers.6
Figure 3.7 provides a graphical representation of many features of our experiment,
as well as some of the above-mentioned findings. First, the dashed lines represent
the constraints on the measures of behaviour. The asymmetric shape of the quad
reflects that, by construction, our experimental design favours errors towards
social information (as it involves short sequences). This is in contrast to the
standard social learning experiments where errors tend to run towards private
information (as in Weizsäcker (2010)). Second, the largest group of subjects
exhibits “tie neglect”, which is a novel type of bias towards social information.
Third, a substantial group of subjects always made optimal information choices.
6Here, “Quad of Rationality” is a sequential-move counterpart of “Diamond of Rationality”
of Duffy et al. (2017).
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Figure 3.7: Quad of Rationality: Information Optimality vs. Bias
Proportion of private information choices out of all 24 information choices (y-axis) vs. propor-
tion of optimal information choices out of all 24 information choices (x-axis), for each of 128
subjects. The size of the bubbles is proportional to the number of subjects with a given pair of
numbers. By construction, the two values are constrained by the dashed lines.
Finally, there are some clusters of biased subjects - a noticeable cluster of “lone
wolves” and a smaller cluster of “herd animals”.
Finding 7. There is substantial individual heterogeneity in optimality and bias
of information choices, with “tie neglect” bias emerging as the most frequent
behavioural feature, followed by optimal choice.
3.5.7 Information Compliance Index (ICI)
Finally, we investigate potential heterogeneity in the use of information, by con-
structing the Information Compliance Index (ICI), which is simply the number
of times a given subject followed observed information when making the payoff-
relevant state guess at all positions (i.e. P1, P2, G1, G2, G3, and G4). As
was discussed earlier, it is difficult to interpret subject’s usage of information at
position G3 when the guesses of the preceding players “tie”. We thus used a
conservative measure of information compliance, with all guesses at position G3
described as compliant, unless the previous guesses coincided (so that the social
information at the position G3 revealed unambiguous majority guess), but the
subject nevertheless guessed the opposite of the prior majority guess. Any value
of ICI which is different from 36 represent a tendency of going against own signal
or the majority. Therefore ICI ranges from 0 to 36, where 0 corresponds to sub-
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Figure 3.8: Distributions of Information Compliance Index (ICI) With and With-
out Tie Neglect
The Information Compliance Index (ICI) is a number of times when a subject followed observed
information. (N of subjects = 128.) Left panel: ICI is based on state guesses at all positions
(P1, P2, G1, G2, G3, and G4), with theoretical range from 0 to 36. Right panel: ICI calculated
without tie neglect, for state guesses for all positions excluding G3, with a theoretical range
from 0 to 30.
jects who never follow the selected information, or guessing the opposite of the
observed information, and 36 corresponds to subjects who always comply with
their observed information.
As one could see from the distribution of the ICI in Figure 3.8 (right panel), the
majority of subjects are perfectly or almost perfectly rational in terms of infor-
mation compliance, while at the same time approximately 67% of the subjects
discard information at least once and about 34% of subjects go against infor-
mation at least three times across the experiment. One could observe similar
pattern of behaviour in Figure 3.8 (left panel) without a possibility of tie neglect
(i.e. when position G3 is excluded).
Although in most cases information was optimally used, errors are also present,
a possibility not considered by previous studies. For example, consider the stan-
dard sequential design with a binary state of the world when both private and
social information is available, and suppose one observes that subject’s choice
coincides with the social (private) information, rather than with the private (so-
cial) one. Such behaviour would typically be interpreted as subject weighting
social (private) information more than private (social) one. However, our find-
ings suggest that this may not necessarily be always the case, as subjects may
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instead ignore social (private) information altogether, and go against their private
(social) information.
Finding 8. A large majority of subjects used the available information (i.e. com-
plied with it). However, a substantial number of subjects used it sub-optimally,
either going against their private signal and/or social information.
3.6 Individual Characteristics and Information Bias
In the previous section, we have identified the existence of individual heterogene-
ity, not only for information choices but also for information usage. Now, we will
attempt to explain such heterogeneity with personal characteristics.
In the third part of the experiment, we collected information on subjects’ cogni-
tive abilities, programme of study and potentially relevant individual traits. In
this section, we attempt to link these personal characteristics to subjects’ hetero-
geneity in information choices and information use.
3.6.1 Individual Characteristics
The average age was 22.9 years. We also collected subjects’ programmes of study,
as the existing literature suggested that programme of study may affect subjects’
decision making - for example, economics students are found to behave differently
in many experiments (e.g. Selten and Ockenfels, (1998); Frank et al. (1993)).
Table 3.4 summarises the programmes of study of our subjects.
Degree Frequency Percentage




Arts and Social Science 62 48.44
Total 128 100
Table 3.4: Summary of Programmes of Study
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)
It is plausible that subjects with higher cognitive abilities perform better in our
experiment, for example, they may choose optimal information and/or follow the
observed information more frequently. As a proxy for subject’s cognitive abilities,
we use subjects’ scores on the multiple-choice version of the Cognitive Reflection
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Test (CRT) (Frederick, 2005). This test involves three simple questions resulting
on a score ranging from 0 (all three answers are wrong) to 3 (all three answers are
correct). For each question, subjects were asked to choose the answer from four
choices. In our sample of subjects, the average CRT score is 1.29, and, consistent
with previous evidence, we find that males have higher average scores (1.74 for
males vs 1.06 for females).7
We define Total Optimality Index (TOI) as the number of subject’s optimal
information choices. It ranges from 0 to 24, where 0 corresponds to a subject
who never chose information optimally (i.e. always chose opposite of PBNE
prediction) and 24 corresponds to a subject whose information choices are always
consistent with PBNE predictions. Figures 3.9 and 3.10 indicate that, indeed,
subjects with high CRT score choose optimal information more frequently and
follow information more frequently. This observation will be confirmed later by
our regression analysis.
Finding 9. Subjects with high measure of a proxy for cognitive ability choose
optimal information more frequently and follow information more frequently.
Individual Traits
It is plausible that individual personalities affect subjects’ behaviour in our ex-
periment, - for example, by biasing subjects towards a particular type of informa-
tion, or affect their attitudes towards the observed information. We conducted an
individual traits survey with 30 six-point scale questions, derived from Costa &
McCrae (1992), Duffy & Kornienko (2010), as well as our own design. These ques-
tions constitute six motives which we label as “Contradictory,” “Social Regret,”
“Theory of Mind,” “Rivalry,” “Altruism,” and “Trust”, using both positively and
negatively keyed questions (see Appendix C).
Our first step is to assess the internal consistency (reliability) of each set of
questions which are supposed to capture a particular motive. We apply a standard
reliability test statistic, Cronbach’s α, with higher values indicating greater inter-
correlation and reliability. After discarding internally inconsistent items, four
7A CRT score of 1.29 out of 3 is considered as an average performance. In a recent meta-
study, Brañas-Garza et al. (2015) collect data from more than 40,000 subjects across over 100
studies and find that the average CRT score is approximately 1.2 out of 3 and male subjects
have higher scores than female subjects. As argued by Frederick (2005) that subjects from elite
universities on average perform better, one potential reason that our sample has a lower than
expected CRT performance might because we collect their CRT response after the main tasks
at the end of the experiment. Brañas-Garza et al. (2012) argue that subjects completed the
CRT as their last task may explain why in their sample 67% subjects scored 0 out of 3.
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Figure 3.9: Cognitive Ability and Optimal Information Choice
Left panel: distribution of Total Optimality Index (TOI) versus average CRT score for subjects
with a particular value of TOI. TOI is the number of subject’s optimal information choices.
Right panel: The distribution of TOI for each CRT score (jittered), together with a fitted line.
motives - “Contradictory,” “Social Regret,” “Theory of Mind” and “Rivalry” -
have α greater than the standard cut-off value of 0.7. In addition, “Altruism”
and “Trust” were marginal, with α of 0.69 and 0.68, respectively. “Trust” was
excluded due to the absence of effect.
We conduct common factor analysis on the retained 21 items, which render ac-
ceptable factorability with α = 0.705 and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of
0.74. Factor analysis on these 21 questions generate four factors with eigenvalues
greater than unity. Based on the signs and magnitudes of these factors in Table
3A.12 in Appendix C, Factor F1 can be interpreted as a tendency for being con-
tradictory and independent; Factor F2 can be interpreted as a tendency for being
social and rivalrous; Factor F3 can be interpreted as a tendency of understanding
others; Factor F4 can be interpreted as a tendency of being non-altruistic.
By constructions, factors are uncorrelated. We also found that there is no sig-
nificant correlation between CRT and any of the four factors. We found gender
differences in the predicted values of factors for each subject (see Table 3.5). Con-
sistently with the previous studies (e.g. Weisberg et al., 2011), females are less
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Figure 3.10: Cognitive Ability and Information Compliance
Left panel: Average CRT score for each value of ICI. Right: the distribution of ICI for each
CRT score (jittered) and a fitted line.
contradictory (more dependent), less socially rivalrous than males, understand
others better, and are more altruistic than males.
3.6.2 Regression Analysis
In this part, we explore whether the above-mentioned individual characteristics
can explain subjects’ behaviour in the lab. Robustness checks can be found in
Appendix D.
Individual Characteristics and Information Choice
In this subsection, we investigate the relationship between information choices
and individual characteristics. We first conduct OLS regression with dependent
variable being the total number of optimal information (TOI) chosen. The inde-
pendent variables are age, gender, cognitive ability (CRT), programme of study
and individual traits. Details are provided in Table 3.6. Our regression results
suggest that CRT scores have a significant positive effect on choosing the optimal
information, consistent with the intuition that subjects with a higher cognitive
ability might identify optimal strategies more frequently. In addition, business
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Factors Motives Female
Factor 1 Contradictory -0.2824
Factor 2 Social-rivalry -0.3357***
Factor 3 Understanding Others 0.2315
-Factor 4 Altruistic 0.2888**
Table 3.5: Table of Individual Motives
Wilcoxon rank-sum test p < 0.1, *; p < 0.05, **; p < 0.01, ***.
students perform significantly worse in terms of information choices than non-
student subjects and given the positive coefficients for Economics and Technical
programmes, business students perform significantly worse than these two groups
as well. Finally, the “Theory of Mind” factor (Factor3) is negatively correlated
with choosing the optimal information. In other words, subjects who claim to be
better understanding others choose optimal information less frequently.
We also explore the potential learning/experience effect by conducting a logistic
regression with the dependent variable of Doptinfo, which is a dummy variable
equals to 1 when the optimal information is chosen. “Time” represents the num-
ber of rounds (ranging from 1 to 36), and “Experience” represents the number
of times a subject experienced a specific position in the formation (ranging from
1 to 6). We find that the logit regression results are consistent with the OLS
results, and there is no learning/experience effect on choosing optimal informa-
tion. However, the categorical variable “Position” in the logit regressions provides
interesting insights. First, Group Position 2 (G2) is significantly positive mean-
ing subjects at position G2 choose private information more frequently. Second,
the coefficient of Group Position 3 (G3) is significantly negative (and even more
negative compared with the coefficient on G2) indicating the tie neglect effect.
Third, the coefficient of Group Position 4 (G4) is close to the coefficient of Group
Position 2 (G2), suggesting similar frequencies of optimal information choices at
G2 and G4.
Finding 10. Subjects with higher CRT scores choose optimal information more
frequently, while subjects with business major and high scores on “Theory of
Mind” factor choose the optimal information less frequently.
Individual Characteristics and Information Compliance
We also test whether individual characteristics can explain how the information
is used. Our OLS regression has a dependent variable “Totalfollowinfo”, which
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Dependent Variable
Total No. Optimal Info Optimal Info
OLS OLS OLS Logit Logit Logit
DFemale -0.18 0.96 1 -0.04 0.24 0.24
(0.73) (0.66) (0.69) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Age 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 0
(0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
DReverse -0.33 0.74 0.66 -0.07 0.19 0.17
(0.85) (0.72) (0.81) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18)
CRT 0.83* 0.80* 0.20** 0.20**
(0.43) (0.43) (0.09) (0.09)
DEcon 1.85 1.44 0.46 0.34
(2.24) (2.45) (0.49) (0.49)
DBuss -3.75* -4.03* -0.81* -0.90**
(2.16) (2.13) (0.47) (0.43)
DTech 1.84 1.44 0.47 0.37
(2.22) (2.32) (0.45) (0.44)
DSocial -0.16 -0.24 -0.04 -0.07









Time 0 0 0
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Experience 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Group Position 2 0.61*** 0.63*** 0.64***
(0.17) (0.18) (0.18)
Group Position 3 -1.33*** -1.40*** -1.42***
(0.19) (0.20) (0.20)
Group Position 4 0.67** 0.69** 0.70**
(0.28) (0.29) (0.30)
Constant 16.14*** 13.44*** 14.31*** 0.74* 0.12 0.37
(1.16) (3.06) (3.24) (0.38) (0.77) (0.74)
Observations 128 128 128 3072 3072 3072
F test/Wald test p 0.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Baseline: male non-student subjects in P2 of the “PG” treatment. By definition, subjects in po-
sition 1 do not have choices over information, and thus not in the regression table.
In OLS regressions, standard errors are clustered by each unique group of 4 subjects; in logit regres-
sions, standard errors are clustered for each subject. p < 0.1, ∗; p < 0.05, ∗∗; p < 0.01, ***.
Table 3.6: Optimal Info Choice and Individual Characteristics
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equals the number of times when the observed information is followed (ICI). We
exclude observations of G3 as it is not clear how to interpret the use of social
information in case of a tie. As Table 3.7 shows, CRT is significantly positively
correlated with the tendency to follow information. Also, information compliance
rate is similar across different positions.
A logistic regression on a dummy variable “Dfollowinfo” (which is equal to 1 when
the observed information is followed) suggests learning effects. Both Time and
Experience variables are significantly correlated with the dependent variable. The
effect of time is positive, suggesting that subjects choose a better strategy (follow
information) as the game proceeds. But the significant negative effect of expe-
rience is surprising. After conducting a logistic regression with experience being
a categorical variable (see Appendix B), we attribute this significant negative ef-
fect of experience is mainly due to subjects following their information at the first
time in a specific position, and deviating afterwards. Given the significant effect
of time, we also conduct the random effect model and find that, consistently with
OLS, subjects with higher CRT follow information more frequently.
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Dependent Variable
Total No. Follow Info Follow Info
OLS OLS OLS Logit Logit Logit
Dfemal -0.52 -0.12 -0.19 -0.24 -0.02 -0.07
(0.68) (0.63) (0.63) (0.29) (0.30) (0.28)
Age 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 0 0
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
DReverse -0.2 0.21 0.29 0.21 0.36 0.37
(0.7) (0.7) (0.66) (0.27) (0.27) (0.26)
CRT 0.85** 0.87** 0.32** 0.31**
(0.36) (0.33) (0.14) (0.13)
DEcon -2.1 -2.86 -1.33 -1.64*
(1.50) (1.84) (0.82) (0.92)
DBuss -2.53 -3.35* -1.51* -1.81**
(1.53) (1.96) (0.80) (0.91)
DTech -3.17** -3.91** -1.47* -1.80*
(1.51) (1.89) (0.85) (0.98)
DSocial -2.80** -3.63** -1.49** -1.87**









Time 0.02** 0.02** 0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Experience -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.17***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Pair Position 2 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Group Position 1 0.10 0.09 0.10
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Group Position 2 0.18 0.18 0.18
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Group Position 4 0.06 0.07 0.07
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Constant 27.50*** 29.91*** 30.71*** 2.14*** 3.44*** 3.97***
(1.3) (1.96) (2.31) (0.56) (1.09) (1.2)
Observations 128 128 128 3840 3840 3840
F test/Wald test p 0.72 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Baseline: male non-student subjects in P1 of the “PG” treatment.
Because “following information” is subject to different interpretations at position 3 as subjects may
face a tie seeing social information, thus it is excluded from our main regression table.
In OLS regressions, standard errors are clustered by each unique group of 4 subjects; in logit regres-
sions, standard errors are clustered for each subject. p < 0.1, ∗; p < 0.05, ∗∗; p < 0.01, ***.
Table 3.7: Information Compliance and Individual Characteristics (G3 excluded)
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3.7 Conclusion
Our experiment modifies the standard sequential social learning setting. Subjects
have to choose to observe either a private signal or the decisions made by earlier
subjects in the sequence, rather than having both forms of information supplied
by default. Compared with standard sequential social learning setting, our exper-
iment enables us to conduct within-subject analysis of individual heterogeneity
in information bias.
Our findings confirm that the individual heterogeneity identified in Duffy et al.
(2017) exists in a sequential social learning environment. Again there are herd
animals biased against private information, lone wolves who are biased toward it
and subjects who behave optimally. In aggregate, there is no overall bias for or
against private information. In other words, when mistakes can run both ways,
they indeed run both ways. Also, it should be noted that social learning is in
general successful. Most subjects switch from choosing private information to
social information in later positions where they should learn from others.
Efficiency concerns can be one explanation why subjects are biased towards pri-
vate information. Our results indicate that when a subject’s decision can be ob-
served by followers, she chooses private information more frequently. By choosing
and revealing private information, one can help the followers in terms of better
social information.
Another interesting finding of our experiment is the existence of “tie neglect”
and confusion/mistakes. Many subjects wrongly believe that two heads are better
than one in our social learning game without realizing the fact that two heads may
disagree with each other. In addition, more than 2/3 of the subjects contradict
their information at least once. This finding challenges the validity of many
earlier studies where confusion/mistakes made by subjects cannot be explicitly
detected.
The relationship between subjects’ behaviour and their individual characteris-
tics provides valuable insights. Among the major characteristics, CRT seems
to be a very good indicator of subjects’ behaviour. Subjects with higher CRT
scores choose optimal information more frequently and follow information more
frequently. In addition, subjects’ individual traits may explain their behaviour in
the lab intuitively.
One potential criticism of this paper is the lack of external validity because the
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real world decision-making environment is hugely simplified in the lab. Our ex-
perimental design follows existing literature in social learning experiment closely
and the validity and limitation of lab experiments is discussed in Roe & Just
(2009).
In brief, heterogeneity in information bias is observed in a sequential social learn-
ing environment. We believe our findings have important practical implications.
An intuitive extension is mechanism design. In situations where a social planner
can determine the sequence of decision making, lone wolves should be positioned
at the beginning of the sequence and herd animals should never be positioned
earlier in the sequence. Alternatively, it is also possible that with the existence
of lone wolves and herd animals, an endogenously formed sequence can be self-
enforcing efficient as herd animals and rational individuals may choose to be in
later positions to wait for social information. Lone wolves, on the other hand,





As Table 3A.8 shows, there is no difference in information choices between “GP”
and “PG” treatments at position 2 in both “Pair” and “Group” formations. Sub-
jects in “GP” treatment are more likely to choose social information at position
G3 (Mann-Whitney p < 0.01) and G4 (Mann-Whitney p < 0.1). This might be
due to subjects in “PG” treatment having longer exposure to others’ “trembling
hands” (mistakes) in the “Pair” formation before they moved to more complex
“Group” formation. However, subjects in both treatments show a very similar
pattern of information choice – the frequency of choosing social information in-
creases at later positions. Figure 3A.1 shows the distributions of information
choices for each treatment. There are no significant differences between the two
distributions (two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test p = 0.84). In other words,
there is no systematic order effect on the total number of private information
choice. Together with the regression results in Section 3.6.2, there is no signifi-
cant systematic order effect.
Percentage of Social Information Chosen
“GP” Treatment “PG” Treatment Mann-Whitney p-value
“Pair”
P1 N/A N/A N/A
P2 27.3 27.9 0.87
“Group”
G1 N/A N/A N/A
G2 18.0 16.4 0.57
G3 64.1 54.2 0.01
G4 86.2 81.0 0.05
Table 3A.8: Information Choices by Treatment
B Effect of Experiences
Figure 3A.2 suggests that the negative significant effect of the experience reported
in Table 3.7 is due to subjects changing their behaviour after the first time they
experience a specific position in the sequence. Furthermore, results of the panel
analysis in Table 3A.9 suggest that overall experience (“Time”) is significant. The
random effect model confirms the positive effect of CRT on complying with in-
formation. While there is an interesting dynamics of complying with information





DFemale -0.24 -0.02 -0.07
(0.29) (0.30) (0.28)
Age 0.02 0 0
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
DReverse 0.22 0.37 0.38
0.26 0.26 0.25
Time 0.02** 0.02** 0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Experience=2 -0.54*** -0.55*** -0.55***
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Experience=3 -0.50*** -0.50*** -0.51***
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Experience=4 -0.62*** -0.63*** -0.64***
(0.21) (0.21) (0.22)
Experience=5 -0.99*** -1.00*** -1.01***
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24)




















Constant 2.20*** 3.50*** 4.03***
0.58 1.09 1.2
Observations 3840 3840 3840
Wald Test p 0.00 0.00 0.00
Logit regressions standard errors are clustered by sub-
ject. p < 0.1, ∗; p < 0.05, ∗∗; p < 0.01, ***.






DFemale -0.36 -0.07 -0.11
(0.33) (0.34) (0.34)
Age 0.03 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
DReverse 0.35 0.59* 0.59*
(0.3) (0.31) (0.3)
Experience=2 -0.56** -0.56** -0.56**
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
Experience=3 -0.47* -0.47* -0.47*
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
Experience=4 -0.56** -0.56** -0.56**
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
Experience=5 -0.92*** -0.92*** -0.92***
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23)




















Constant 3.08*** 4.30*** 4.50***
(0.73) (1.44) (1.42)
Observations 3840 3840 3840
Wald Test p 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel variable is each subject and time variable is Time
with range [1, 36]. p < 0.1, ∗; p < 0.05, ∗∗; p < 0.01,
***.
Table 3A.10: Information Compliance and Individual Characteristics (Random
Effects)
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Figure 3A.1: Distributions of TPI by Treatment
TPI in “PG” (green) and “GP” (white) treatments. N of subjects = 64 in each treatment.
Figure 3A.2: Experience Effect in “Group” Formation
The x-axis represents Experience from 1 to 6, the y-axis - the average percentage. Top Left:
The dynamics of information choices at G2, G3 and G4. Top Right: The dynamics of following
the social information at G2, G3 and G4. 170 cases of a tie at G3 are excluded from the
calculation. Bottom Left: The dynamics of following the private information at G1, G2, G3
and G4.
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C Individual Traits Questions
Answer options (coded 1-6, respectively): “Never”, “Almost Never”, “Some-
times”, “Frequently”, “Almost Always”, and “Always” . The order of questions
was scrambled. Due to internal inconsistency, questions 27-30 were excluded, as
well as “Trust” motive due to marginal internal consistency (α = 0.68) and no
significant effect of inclusion on the results. “Code” identifies factor loading in
Table 3A.12.
No. Question Motive Mean (SD) Alpha Code
1 Behave unconventionally.a Contradictory (+) 3.23 (1.07) 0.825 zqct2
2 Take the opposite route from everyone else.b Contradictory (+) 3.38 (0.93) zqct3
3 Run against the crowd. Contradictory (+) 3.3 (0.98) zqct4
4 Am at ease when behaving differently from others.b Contradictory (+) 3.74 (1.24) zqct5
5 Follow others to avoid being the only one making a mistake. Contradictory (-) 2.73 (0.95) zqct6
6 Do what others do rather than rely on my opinion. Contradictory (-) 2.53 (0.78) zqct7
7 Ignore my own gut feeling and instead follow other people.b Contradictory (-) 2.7 (0.81) zqct8
8 Find it easier to follow others than to search for my own path.a Contradictory (-) 2.65 (0.97) zqct9
9 Feel better with a loss when everyone else lost as well. Social Regret (+) 4.05 (1.22) 0.747 zqsr1
10 Feel better when losing in a group than losing alone. Social Regret (+) 4.09 (1.27) zqsr3
11 Regret my mistakes less when others made the same choice. Social Regret (+) 3.91 (1.11) zqsr4
12 Understand how others think.b Theory of Mind (+) 3.9 (1.11) 0.785 zqtm1
13 Able to explain others’ behavior.b Theory of Mind (+) 3.77 (0.98) zqtm2
14 Feel I am not good at understanding others’ behavior.b Theory of Mind (-) 2.77 (1.04) zqtm3
15 Drawn to compete with others.a Rivalry (+) 3.61 (1.13) 0.765 zqrv3
16 Feel that I must win at everything.a Rivalry (+) 3.16 (1.57) zqrv4
17 Feel that winning or losing doesn’t matter to me.a Rivalry (-) 3.07 (1.12) zqrv1
18 Feel sympathy for those who are less fortunate than me.a Altruism (+) 4.65 (1.02) 0.691 zqal3
19 Love to help others.a Altruism (+) 4.48 (1.12) zqal4
20 Try not to do favors for others.a Altruism (-) 2.16 (0.87) zqal2
21 Feel indifference to others’ misfortunes.a Altruism (-) 2.41 (1.10) zqal1
EXCLUDED Questions
22 Trust in others doing the job well. Trust (+) 3.54 (1.00) zqtr1
23 Believe that others have good intentions.c Trust (+) 4.04 (0.96) zqtr2
24 Feel that others don’t know what they are doing.b Trust (-) 3.36 (0.98) zqtr3
25 Doubt others’ abilities or intentions.b Trust (-) 3.23 (0.94) zqtr4
26 Suspect hidden motives in others.c Trust (-) 3.45 (1.08) zqtr5
27 Feel uncomfortable to do things differently from the group.b Social Regret (+) 2.84 (0.95) zqsr5
28 Before I make a choice, I try to find out what other people choose. Social Regret (+) 3.46 (1.01) zqsr2
29 Feel confused about why people do what they do. ToM (-) 3.61 (1.21) zqtm4
30 Avoid situations involving competition.a Rivalry (-) 2.99 (1.15) zqrv2
Sources: (a) Duffy and Kornienko (2010); (b) Duffy et al (2016); (c) Costa and McCrae (1992).
Table 3A.11: Individual Traits Questions
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Code Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Uniqueness
zqct2 0.5501 0.2437 -0.1758 0.1448 0.5862
zqct3 0.6648 0.1779 0.1006 0.2101 0.4721
zqct4 0.7138 0.2412 -0.0765 0.1606 0.4006
zqct5 0.5365 -0.0037 0.0083 0.1842 0.6781
zqct6 -0.6498 0.3511 0.054 0.1056 0.4404
zqct7 -0.7313 0.1105 0.002 0.198 0.4137
zqct8 -0.553 0.2796 0.0559 0.0922 0.6044
zqct9 -0.5858 0.146 0.0271 0.0801 0.6283
zqsr1 -0.1891 0.6256 0.3612 -0.1933 0.405
zqsr3 -0.2106 0.5135 0.3851 -0.0878 0.5359
zqsr4 -0.1578 0.5535 0.2905 -0.0587 0.5808
zqtm1 0.2443 -0.0104 0.6699 0.371 0.3538
zqtm2 0.2188 -0.0386 0.7025 0.3139 0.3587
zqtm3 -0.0632 0.2204 -0.5217 -0.0954 0.6662
zqrv3 0.389 0.5137 -0.0045 -0.28 0.5063
zqrv4 0.2869 0.5194 0.0084 -0.1992 0.6081
zqrv1 -0.2996 -0.4971 0.2179 0.2721 0.5416
zqal3 0.1174 -0.0728 0.3512 -0.503 0.6046
zqal4 0.1155 -0.2661 0.3343 -0.382 0.6582
zqal2 -0.0431 0.3885 -0.1838 0.3507 0.6904
zqal1 0.0504 0.4674 -0.2966 0.2919 0.6059
Table 3A.12: Factor Loadings
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D Robustness Check
As the range of our variables is limited, we checked whether our results of Table
3.6 and Table 3.7 are robust to censoring.
Dependent Variable:
Total No. of Optimal Info
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DFemale -0.11 0.77 0.74 1.21* 1.28*
(0.76) (0.79) (0.77) (0.71) (0.73)
Age 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.02
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
DReverse -0.4 0.14 0.46 0.78 0.72
(0.92) (0.83) (0.76) (0.76) (0.84)
CRT 1.23*** 0.93** 0.91**
(0.40) (0.46) (0.45)
DEcon 3.74* 2.37 1.94
(2.17) (2.42) (2.56)
DBuss -2.65 -3.83* -4.09*
(1.97) (2.20) (2.11)
DTech 3.93** 2.11 1.7
(1.92) (2.33) (2.40)










Constant 16.41*** 14.02*** 13.10*** 13.19*** 14.01***
(1.27) (1.45) (2.96) (3.19) (3.31)
Observations 128 128 128 128 128
F-Test p 0.79 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tobit regressions with lower limit of 0 and upper limit of 24.
Baseline: male non-student subjects in P2 of the “PG” treatment.
Standard errors are clustered by groups of 4 subjects. p < 0.1, ∗; p < 0.05, ∗∗;
p < 0.01, ***.
Table 3A.13: Optimal Information Choice and Individual Characteristics
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Dependent Variable:
Total No. of Follow Info
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DFemale -0.75 0.09 -0.68 -0.19 -0.33
(0.91) (0.99) (0.81) (0.82) (0.84)
Age 0.06 0.05 0.02 -0.03 -0.03
(0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
DReverse -0.03 0.68 0.01 0.79 0.83
0.9 0.93 0.87 0.93 0.86
CRT 1.24*** 1.51*** 1.53***
(0.44) (0.53) (0.48)
DEcon -2.64 -4.46 -5.26
(3.07) (3.04) (3.40)
DBuss -4.05 -5.90* -6.85*
(3.14) (3.17) (3.59)
DTech -3.84 -6.68** -7.43**
(3.02) (3.04) (3.37)










Constant 27.53*** 25.60*** 32.39*** 32.64*** 33.65***
(2.06) (2.34) (3.77) (3.76) (4.15)
Observations 128 128 128 128 128
F-Test p 0.65 0.02 0.50 0.02 0.05
Tobit regressions with lower limit of 0 and upper limit of 30.
Baseline: male non-student subjects in P2 of the “PG” treatment.
Standard errors are clustered by groups of 4 subjects. p < 0.1, ∗; p < 0.05, ∗∗;
p < 0.01, ***.
Table 3A.14: Information Compliance and Individual Characteristics
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CHAPTER 4 A MODEL OF MOTIVATED OVERCON-
FIDENCE
4.1 Introduction
The prevalence of overconfidence is widespread and robust.1 Overconfidence and
its consequence on economic activities have been addressed by economists since
Adam Smith, who noted that “The over-weening conceit which the greater part
of men have of their own abilities, is an ancient evil remarked by the philosophers
and moralists of all ages.”(Smith 1776, Book I). Such “ancient evil” still concerns
modern economists, as DeBondt & Thaler (1995) point out that the prevalence
of overconfidence is “perhaps the most robust finding in the psychology of judge-
ment”. Overconfident beliefs may lead to suboptimal decisions in many ways.
Daniel Kahneman remarks that overconfidence is “the most damaging” among
the various flaws that bedevil decision-making (see, Shariatmadari, 2015).
In economics, researchers care not only how overconfidence affects decision mak-
ers, but also about the motives behind. In general, two intrapersonal motives
have been proposed to explain the widely observed overconfident behaviour. The
first intrapersonal motive argues that self-image concerns asymmetrically affect
the interpretation of information about one’s abilities, and this asymmetry can
lead to overconfidence. In other words, people prefer to inflate the beliefs about
their own ability simply for the consumption value of holding high beliefs about
themselves (Bénabou & Tirole, 2002; Kőszegi, 2006). Through the same channel,
patients may be reluctant to see a doctor in order to maintain a positive view
of one’s health and to avoid potential health anxiety (Kőszegi, 2003). Benôıt &
Dubra (2011) propose that one possible mechanism for individuals to achieve in-
flated beliefs is through asymmetric seeking/updating information. People with
low self-assessment tend to keep seeking information about their ability as long
as there is a chance for improvement, on the other hand, they stop searching for
information when there is little room to update their beliefs upward.
The second intrapersonal motive suggests that overconfidence is instrumental in
dealing with self-control problems. The primary argument is that confidence in
1The term overconfidence is used broadly by psychologists and economists, referring to both
over-optimism and over-precision (Grubb, 2015). Overoptimistic people overestimate their own
abilities or prospects, in absolute terms or in comparison to others. In contrast, over-precision
describes the phenomena that people place overly narrow confidence intervals around their
forecasts. In this paper, overconfidence is used interchangeably as over-optimism.
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ones ability or chances of success is a compelling motivator to conduct and per-
severe in challenging tasks or long-term projects. These models (e.g. Carrillo
& Mariotti, 2000; Bénabou & Tirole, 2002) assume the existence of self-control
problem (or “weakness of will”) and its corresponding negative welfare conse-
quences (e.g. insufficient saving and suboptimal level of effort). Overconfidence
thus can serve as a commitment tool to handle the self-control issue: by believ-
ing exerting effort brings a greater future payoff, agents become less vulnerable
to current temptation. Agents with “weakness of will” in these models are es-
sentially similar to individuals with hyperbolic discounting preference (Laibson,
1997). For example, to motivate oneself to save more, the agent may choose to
hold an inflated belief about the real return of saving.
Although it is beyond the scope of the present paper, Bénabou & Tirole (2002)
and Burks et al. (2013) suggest that overconfidence might be a result of inter-
personal social signalling. Since people care about what others would think of
them, overconfidence is driven by the motive to send positive signals to others
about their ability. Therefore, overconfidence might be a socially rooted bias.
However, it should be noted that there is no definite evidence to suggest whether
interpersonal overconfidence is a direct result of biased updating or strategical
misleading (Burks et al., 2013).
The current paper develops an intrapersonal overconfidence model based on the
classical models by Bénabou & Tirole (2002) and differs in two key features. First,
I introduce a waiting stage where agents are no longer able to change the already
exerted effort level but still need to wait for the payoff. Such situation is common
in real life, for example, it is common to wait for exam/application/journal sub-
mission results for a long time. Second, I propose a quadratic cost for distorting
beliefs (compared to the fixed cost in previous models). More extreme deviations
are increasingly more costly to hold in this model, and the existence of such physi-
cal/mental costs explain the fact that in reality, wild beliefs are not typical. With
these modifications, this model predicts that in equilibrium, the agent holds a dy-
namic pattern of overconfident belief across time. Specifically, people are most
overconfident when starting a project, the confidence level gradually diminishes
over time, and a discontinuous decrease is expected after the submission of the
work. Then during the waiting period, the confidence continues to decline until
the date of result realisation. Our model suggests that overconfidence should not
be treated as a static fact. Instead, people’s expectation about future outcomes
depends critically on the timing.
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4.2 Related Literature
In this section, I present a selective review of the existing literature. In the
first part, the empirical and experimental evidence on overconfidence found by
economists and psychologists is presented. Then I provide a selective review of
the theoretical models explaining the motives of overconfidence.
4.2.1 The Existence of Overconfidence
In the social psychology literature, overconfidence has had a prominent position
for many decades. Baumhart (1968) finds that business people believe that they
have better business ethics practice that others. Larwood & Whittaker (1977)
conclude that management students and corporate presidents hold a self-serving
bias of their own competence and consistently overestimate their abilities in sales
and marketing environment. Langer (1975) suggests that people often experience
“illusion of control” when playing a game of chance. They feel as if they can
control the next roll of the dice and thus overestimate the probability of success.
A famous study by Svenson (1981) suggests that in an experiment, 83 percent of
American subjects think that they were in the top 30 percent regarding driving
safety and skills. Similarly, the “Lake Wobegon effect” or “better than average
effect” that everyone believes that she is above average have been supported by
many studies (Cannell, 1988; Brown, 2012).
The prevalence of overconfidence in economic activities is supported by
economists. There is a growing literature studying the behaviour of overconfident
CEOs, investors, and consumers. Malmendier & Tate (2005) draws implications
from observing when CEOs choose to exercise their stock options. They find that
CEOs are not exercising their options timely so that they are under-diversified
concerning their own company-specific risk. Otto (2014) measures CEO overcon-
fidence by studying the gap between firm’s voluntary earnings forecasts and the
realised earnings. In finance, the active investing puzzle refers to the phenomena
that individual investors often engage in excessive trading activities. The more
active investors are, the more they typically lose (Odean, 1999). Evidence sug-
gests that overconfidence provides a natural explanation for the active investing
puzzle since overconfident investors trade more aggressively in the face of trans-
actions costs and negative expected payoffs (Odean, 1998). This claim is further
supported by studying the gender difference in trading behaviour. Based on the
robust psychological finding that men are more overconfident than women2, Bar-
2For example, see Deaux & Farris (1977) and Lundeberg et al. (1994). Lundeberg et al.
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ber & Odean (2001) find clear evidence that males are trading more actively than
females.
Overconfidence about self-control ability is a leading explanation for why con-
sumers overpay for gym memberships that they underutilise. Overconfident indi-
viduals overestimate their self-control ability and thus overweight the membership
benefit and avoid paying for per-visit gym fees. However, based on the actual
number of visits, a significant proportion of consumers can be better off by not
signing up gym membership (just pay a per-visit fee instead) (DellaVigna & Mal-
mendier, 2006). Experimental results suggest that individuals are over-optimistic
about the likelihood of redeeming rebates (Silk, 2004). Many subjects choose
the long-term larger payment over immediate cash in the lab but forget to claim
later (Ericson, 2011). According to Grubb & Osborne (2014), many consumers
select the suboptimal mobile plan due to overconfidence. Thus facing overconfi-
dent consumers, firms have an incentive to complicate their contracts or distort
marginal prices and product quality to exploit the mistake (Grubb, 2015).
A natural question is why overconfidence does not die out with learning. Re-
searchers have found evidence of different perspectives indicating that learning
is often challenging and inefficient in reality. Since firms have no incentive to
de-bias consumers, consumers are unlikely to receive information for learning
(Gabaix & Laibson, 2006). Experimental evidence by Subbotin (1996) suggests
that even outcome feedback is available, consumers often respond ineffectively
in practice. The persistence of overconfidence may also be enhanced by the fact
that different behavioural biases may reinforce each other. For example, the the-
ory of cognitive dissonance by Festinger (1962) suggests that people experience
stress when confronted with information that contradicts existing beliefs, and
thus try to avoid such belief-changing information. Behavioural CEOs thus may
choose to learn insufficiently to sustain a high self-esteem generated from past
success. CEO overconfidence may also be strengthened by self-attribution bias.
Self-attribution bias suggests people regard successful outcomes as a result of
their own skill but blame unsuccessful results on luck (Shefrin, 2002). It also can
explain the active investing puzzle as investors who have achieved high returns
attribute the success to their high trading skill and become increasingly overcon-
fident, while investors who experience low returns attribute it to bad luck and
do not adjust their overconfidence level (Gervais & Odean, 2001). Cursedness,
(1994) also indicates that such gender difference is task specific and Prince (1993) finds that
men are more overconfident than women in financial oriented tasks.
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an equilibrium concept developed in Eyster & Rabin (2005), is another reason
behind the persistence of overconfident investors. The inability of learning from
other people’s actions leads to overweighting private overconfident judgement in
decision-making. A cursed investor underweights the information implicit in the
actions of others, and hence trades readily in the financial market (Eyster et al.,
2015).
On the other hand, the difficulty of learning is challenged by several recent studies.
Hoelzl & Rustichini (2005) shows that the alleged persistence of overconfidence
depends critically on the ambiguity of the traits evaluated and on the monetary
incentives. Subjects are learning more effectively when financial incentives are
presented. Similarly, in J. Clark & Friesen (2009), the individual overconfidence
for both relative and absolute self-assessments is eliminated in a real effort task
once monetary incentives and timely feedback are provided. Another stand of
theories suggests that the persistence of overconfidence is indeed an equilibrium.
In other words, people are motivated to hold overconfident beliefs about them-
selves. In the following part, I briefly describe three primary motives proposed
by economists: social signal, consumption and self-efficacy.
4.2.2 The Causes of Overconfidence
Burks et al. (2013) experimentally test three mechanisms that produce over-
confidence: Bayesian updating (Benôıt & Dubra, 2011), concern for ego util-
ity (Kőszegi, 2006) and social signalling. They reject the first two mechanisms
and argue that overconfidence is likely to be a social signalling bias. The idea
of socially rooted overconfidence is initially proposed by several psychologists
and economists. For example, the sociometer theory suggests that self-esteem
is primarily developed to motivate people to behave in ways that sustain their
connections with other people (Leary et al., 1995). Therefore, people choose
to be overconfident to boost self-esteem to achieve higher relational value from
social interaction. Bénabou & Tirole (2002) focus on the strategic interaction
aspect of being overconfident. Believing oneself to be of high ability makes it
much easier to convince others that one indeed is competent. In other words,
to lie most convincingly one must believe her own lies. In a classical bargaining
experiment, Proeger & Meub (2014) find that overconfidence in individualistic
setting does not persist. However, the introduction of a basic observational social
setting fosters overconfident self-assessments. Through the lens of tournament
experiments, Charness et al. (2014) find that overconfidence is motivated at least
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partly by strategic considerations. Also, subjects may be unconscious about the
emergence of overconfidence in the strategic environment. Ewers & Zimmermann
(2015) find that the reported performance measure on quiz questions submitted
by subjects is significantly higher when an audience presents. They argue that
overconfidence might be a consequence of social approval seeking. Thoma (2016)
experimentally confirms the social roots of overconfidence through Raven Matrix
tournaments. She finds that subjects, especially male subjects, inflate or deflate
their self-assessment strategically in response to the social environment.
The self-image and anticipatory utility argument for overconfidence indicates that
since people derive ego utility from positive views about the self (current and fu-
ture), there is an incentive to hold overconfident beliefs about their abilities or
future income (Kőszegi, 2006; Weinberg, 2009; Kőszegi, 2010). In brief, when
beliefs directly affect utility, people tend to hold overconfident beliefs. Kőszegi
(2006) shows that biased views can emerge purely from ego utility and without
the necessity of biased information processing in most previous literature. He also
suggests that the agent manages her self-image by distorting financial choices rel-
ative to her present beliefs. Weinberg (2009) identifies conditions under which a
rational, time-consistent agent prefers to overestimate his ability. In his model,
individuals care about their beliefs about their ability in a risk averse manner.
Risk aversion over ability leads people to limit their learning about their actual
ability to sustain an inflated view of themselves. Before the above two studies,
there are two strands of non-Bayesian models that predict overconfident self-
views. In one set, individuals directly choose their beliefs and prefer to become
moderately overconfident rather than exactly accurate to make themselves feel
better (Akerlof & Dickens, 1982; Brunnermeier & Parker, 2005). In other mod-
els, biased views are generated from misinterpreting new information (Gervais
& Odean, 2001). Eil & Rao (2011) conduct a laboratory experiment to test the
correlation between belief-based utility and information processing and acqui-
sition. Their findings suggest that self-esteem concerns lead people to update
information asymmetrically. In brief, people update their beliefs consistent with
Bayesian for good news and significantly discount bad news. Recent information
avoidance literature suggests that people may actively choose to avoid bad news
in the face of avoidance costs (Golman et al., 2017).
Overconfident beliefs also have a significant instrumental value, enhancing indi-
viduals’ self-efficacy. Confidence in ones ability and chances of success is a strong
motivator to undertake challenging tasks and persevere in long-term projects
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(Bénabou & Tirole, 2016). The above argument depends critically on the as-
sumption that people have imperfect willpower (self-control problem) and vulner-
able to present temptations such as over-consuming or shirking. Overconfidence
can be adopted as a commitment device to deal with the self-control problem:
simply, people are more likely to work/save if they are optimistic about the out-
come of the project/investment. Several seminal papers have contributed to the
instrumental motive of overconfidence (Carrillo & Mariotti, 2000; Bénabou &
Tirole, 2002, 2004). Although overconfidence as a commitment device is intu-
itively convincing, limited empirical evidence has been identified. Using data
from the Survey of Consumer Finances, Puri & Robinson (2007) find that more
optimistic people work harder and save more. However, the overconfidence of
more successful individuals can also be explained by learning: previous success
breeds over-optimistic beliefs (Malmendier & Taylor, 2015). In the next chapter
of this thesis, I provide some empirical evidence supporting the significance of
instrumental overconfidence.
4.3 Model
In this section, I develop a simple intrapersonal model of motivated overconfi-
dence. In the benchmark model, neither the consumption motive nor the in-
strumental motive is considered (cognitive distortions are not possible), and then
I nest the consumption motive and instrumental motive sequentially into the
benchmark. A risk neutral agent i faces three periods. During the working pe-
riod (t = 1), she works on a particular task and submits her work. Then she
waits for the result during the waiting period (t = 2) and eventually, she reaps a
final payoff during the realisation period (t = 3).
4.3.1 The Benchmark Model
In the benchmark model, the agent does not distort her belief, and the only choice
variable is the level of effort. At t = 1, she decides on her effort level (e.g. hours
of working) e > 0. Exerting effort is costly and the cost is c · e, c > 0. The final
payoff V (θ, e) = θ ln(e) depends on effort level e and ability θ > 0. I assume that
the agent knows her actual ability θ and the payoff function V (·).
At t = 2, she has finished her work and thus is no longer able to change e but
there is still time waiting for result realisation. For simplicity, in this paper,
I assume that the agent has a perfect memory about the amount of effort she
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exerted at t = 1 and she does not distort her memory.3 At t = 3, she receives
a final payoff U3 = V (θ, e). Let ω2 ≥ 0 and ω3 ≥ 0 represent the weighting
she puts on the waiting period and the realisation period respectively. In other
words, ω2 and ω3 are the “awareness” parameter which measure to what extent
the agent is aware of her future utility at t = 2 and t = 3. δ ∈ (0, 1], is the
normal discounting parameter, which represents how patient the agent is. Let Ut
represent the instantaneous utility, and UTt be the total utility at t. The agent is
simply choosing the effort level, e, to maximise the present discounted utility at
t = 1:
U1 = −ce (4.1)
In addition, the agent anticipates that:4
UT2 = ω3δU3 (4.2)
UT3 = U3 = θ ln(e) (4.3)







UT1 = −ce+ ω2δU2 + ω3δ2U3 (4.4)





The optimal level of effort in the benchmark model, eB, has intuitive properties.
First, it is positively determined by the agent’s ability θ so that more competent
agent works harder in the equilibrium. Second, the agent who cares more about
future utility works more. δ · ω, a combination of awareness and patience rep-
resents to what extend the agent cares about future utility. Third, the optimal
level of effort is negatively correlated with the cost of effort.
The benchmark model has a straightforward prediction that the agent chooses
3In reality, it is possible that the individual may be motivated to have a selective memory
(e.g. memorising good signals and forgetting bad ones (Chew et al., 2015)). However, in terms
of behavioural outcomes selective memory can be equivalent to the belief distortions I introduce
later (Bénabou, 2015).
4U2 = 0 because at t = 2, the agent has submitted her work and cannot change her effort,
while she is still away from payoff realisation. Thus, UT2 = U2 + ω3δU
T
3 . Given t = 3 is the
final period, UT3 is indeed equivalent to U3, which equals θ ln(e).
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the optimal level of effort to maximise her present discounted utility. In the
next parts, I extend it to include cognitive distortions from consumption and
instrumental motives.
4.3.2 Consumption Motive
One source of cognitive distortion comes from the fact that the agent derives an-
ticipatory feelings from thinking about the future payoff, and can be motivated
to inflate her belief about the payoff to enjoy the positive feelings. Such cogni-
tive distortions are denoted as consumption motive (also known as affect-driven
motive in Bénabou (2015)). Let s · τt ·Xt represent the anticipatory utility, where
s > 0 is the savouring parameter representing the extent to which she cares about
anticipatory feelings, τt ≥ 0 accounts for the time distance between t and the re-
alisation date T and thus by definition, τ1 > τ2 > τ3 = 0. In other words, τ1 is
the sum of the length of period one t1 and period two t2, τ2 is the length of period
two t2 only, τ3 = 0 as there is no distance between t3 and T (t3 = T ). Therefore
by construction, τ1 > τ2 > τ3 = 0. Xt represents her belief at t about the final
payoff. Importantly, Xt does not necessarily equal V (·) since an agent can be
motivated to hold a biased belief.5 Consequently, in our model, the anticipatory
utility is positively correlated with τt because there are more opportunities for
savouring as waiting time increases (Bénabou, 2013, p. 434).
I assume that cognitive distortions are costly. Physical or mental costs are in-
curred while the agent tries to bias her belief about the payoff.6 In my model, I
introduce a quadratic cost on payoff distortion λ(Xt−V (θ, e))2, which depends on
the degree of realism λ > 0 and the magnitude of distortion on payoff, Xt−V (θ, e).
I use quadratic cost function (increasingly costly deviation) to capture the fact
that as the desired beliefs are further away from reality, they are increasingly
more difficult to be justified.7 Such quadratic cost function also keeps the con-
sumption motive in our model consistent with Brunnermeier & Parker (2005)
that, small bias in beliefs leads to first-order gains in anticipatory utility and
only second-order costs.
5Specifically, X1 is the agent’s expectation about the final reward at t = 1; X2 is the agent’s
expectation about the final reward at t = 2 and X3 is her expectation about the final reward
just before realisation.
6Physical costs can be involved during the process of active information avoidance (Golman
et al., 2017) and selective attention (Schwartzstein, 2014). Mental costs incur when an agent
adopts mental strategies, such as biased searching through memory for justifications for desired
beliefs (Kunda, 1990).
7Bracha & Brown (2012) provides a model for biased perception about risk with similar
cost argument.
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At t = 1 with consumption motive, the agent is choosing both effort and belief,
{e,X1} maximising UT1 :
arg max
{e, X1}






Therefore, compared with the benchmark model, the agent now derives utility
from anticipating the final payoff, sτ1X1 and simultaneously pays a belief distor-
tion cost λ(X1 − θ ln(e))2. The same applies to UT2 :
arg max
X2





The agent at t = 2 also derives utility from anticipation and thus can choose to
bias her belief. Importantly, as τ1 > τ2, the agent savours less at t = 2 compared
to t = 1. Consistent with the benchmark setup, the key difference between the
second and first period is the choice of effort. At t = 2, effort e is already
determined and exerted so she is no longer able to choose the level of effort at
the waiting period.
At t = 3, there is no time nor opportunities left for savouring as τ3 = 0, therefore
X3 is a choice of the following:
arg max
X3
UT3 = θ ln(e)− λ(X3 − θ ln(e))2 (4.8)
That is, at t = 3 the agent reaps a final payoff but there is no anticipatory utility
and thus in equilibrium XC3 is not distorted as shown in the following equation




. Solving equation (4.6), (4.7) and (4.8) simultaneously, we
get the intrapersonal equilibrium with consumption motive:
eC =






















The intrapersonal equilibrium with consumption motive provides several impor-
tant insights. First, compared with the benchmark model, the equilibrium level
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of effort, eC , is higher since eC − eB = sθ(τ1+δτ2ω2)
c
> 0. In other words, the fact
that one derives utilities from anticipation motivates the individual to work more.
The magnitude of this effect is positively correlated with the savouring parameter
s. On the other hand, consistent with the benchmark model, the equilibrium level
of effort is positively determined by her ability, awareness and patience. If s = 0,
eC = eB. Second, overconfident beliefs emerge. The equilibrium result predicts
that the agent holds overconfident beliefs about the final payoff at t = 1 and t = 2












> 0. The emergence of
overconfident beliefs is because the agent derives greater utility from more pos-
itive beliefs. The optimal degree of overconfidence is positively correlated with
the savouring parameter s as the agent who derives more utility from savouring
has greater incentive to be overconfident. Third, overconfident belief diminishes
over time and converges to the unbiased level at the end of the waiting period.
The drop in overconfidence from t = 1 to t = 2, XC1 − XC2 = (τ1 − τ2) s2λ > 0,
states the fact that overconfidence diminishes over time. In the end, just before





result is driven by the assumption that anticipatory utility diminishes over time,
as less time available for savouring, the agent is less likely to costly inflates her
belief.
Summary 1. Anticipatory utility leads to the emergence of overconfident beliefs.
The agent who savours future payoffs more frequently works harder and holds
more overconfident beliefs. The degree of overconfidence diminishes over time
until the realisation of payoff, where her belief becomes unbiased.
Figure 4.1 shows the dynamic of overconfidence with the consumption motive.
4.3.3 The Self-control Problem and Instrumental Motive
The Weakness of Will
The above section illustrates the cognitive distortion from the anticipatory utility
(consumption motive). In this section, I extend the benchmark model to allow for
an alternative motive of distortion, the instrumental motive associated with the
self-control problem. Self-control problems are prevalent and examples include
problem drinking (Vuchinich & Simpson, 1998), obesity (Philipson & Posner,
2008; Charness & Gneezy, 2009), under-saving (Loewenstein et al., 2003) and
suboptimal contracting (DellaVigna & Malmendier, 2004, 2006). Bénabou &






Start End of Working Realisation
Figure 4.1: Dynamic overconfidence with the consumption motive
is, the agent has imperfect willpower, and any costly actions at present is subject
to a temptation problem. Mathematically, an agent with the weakness of will is
equivalent to an agent with hyperbolic discounting preference (Bénabou, 2015).
In the present paper, I follow the classical hyperbolic discounting approach to
model the self-control problem. Let β ∈ (0, 1] be the hyperbolic discounting rate,
which measures the degree of present bias (or her self-control ability), where β = 1
means the agent does not suffer from present bias and has perfect self-control
ability. The following equation takes the self-control problem into consideration,
and the solution predicts less effort exerted compared to the benchmark model.
arg max
e
UT1 = −ce+ βω2δUT2 + βω3δ2UT3 (4.10)




UT3 = θ ln(e) (4.12)






Compared with the benchmark case, it is straightforward to observe that due
to self-control problem, the agent exerts less effort as eweak = βeB. The degree
of shirking depends on her self-control ability β, the agent with less self-control
ability shirks more. Shirking due to present bias is a welfare loss.8 Therefore,
in order to keep motivating oneself to exert enough efforts towards the optimal
level, one should be overconfident, specifically, to hold an inflated belief about her
ability θ.9 Such cognitive distortions are denoted as instrumental motive (also
known as self-efficacy motive in Bénabou & Tirole (2004) or functional motive in
Bénabou & Tirole (2016)). In this model, I focus on the case that agent distorts
her ability belief towards the ex-post optimal level of effort (which is eB). In
other words, the commitment device of being overconfident solves the self-control
problem perfectly.
Instrumental Motive
Instrumental motive suggests that the agent distorts her ability for motivation,
and I assume ability distortion is costly as well. Costs associated with ability
distortion can be modelled with the same fashion (quadratic cost function) as
payoff distortion, while in this section I assume the ability distortion cost ψ > 0 is
fixed. The fixed cost assumption about ability distortion simplifies the analysis.10
Assuming the agent is sophisticated that she knows her self-control ability β.
Therefore she can deal with the self-control problem by inflating her belief about
her own ability. Such ability distortion incurs a physical/mental cost ψ. As a
consequence, the agent only boosts her perception about her ability if the benefit
from exerting the ex-post optimal effort outweighs the cost of distortion. Let
I ∈ {0, 1} be the indicator of ability distortion. I = 1 if the agent chooses to
inflate her belief about ability and I = 0 if not. θI is the distorted belief about
the ability which leads to the ex-post optimal level of effort exertion. Then the
agent solves the following equation in the face of the self-control problem and the
8In this paper, the welfare analysis follows the “long-run perspective” proposed by
O’Donoghue & Rabin (1999). That is, the dis-utility due to present bias (“weakness of will”) is
excluded in the welfare calculation, and mathematically, β = 1 is used to identify the optimal
strategies. Therefore, eB is the optimal strategy and eweak is suboptimal.
9The exact direction of belief distortion depends on the nature of the task: instrumental
motive inflates belief when θ and e are complements, Vθe > 0. On the other hand, for tasks
where θ and e are substitutes, agents may hold under-confident beliefs–a form of “defensive
pessimism”(Bénabou & Tirole, 2002). Defensive pessimism often applies to tasks to achieve
some threshold level of performance (e.g. Pass/Fail marking scheme)(Bénabou, 2015). In this
paper, I model efforts and ability as complements.
10In Appendix C, I provide an alternative model where ability distortion cost is quadratic,










I − θ) ln(e) + θ ln(e)
(4.14)
The equilibrium depends on the cost of ability distortion ψ. In this paper I focus
on the most interesting case when ψ ≤ ψ̄ (the ability distortion cost is not too
high11). And thus the solution of equation (4.14), {II , eI} (superscript I stands






The above result indicates that when the distortion cost is not too high, the agent
chooses to inflate her belief on her own ability to motivate herself. In equilibrium,
her belief about her ability is higher than her true ability as θI = θ
β
. By taking
this commitment device, she is able to exert the optimal level of effort in the face
of the self-control problem as eI = eB > eweak. In addition, her payoff expectation


















the degree of overconfidence depends on the agent’s self-control ability, β. The
agent with low self-control ability holds more overconfident beliefs because she
faces greater temptation and requires higher inflation of ability for motivation.
And higher inflation of ability leads to higher payoff expectation.
For t = 2 and t = 3, the agent is no longer able to exert additional effort and thus
the self-control problem does not matter. Therefore the agent does not distort
her ability because it is costly and useless to do so (since the effort is already
11The threshold value ψ̄ is positive and negatively determined by β . When ψ > ψ̄, no ability
distortion adopted since it is too costly. Details can be found in Appendix C
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exerted at t = 1). That is: 








Summary 2. Instrumental motive leads to the emergence of overconfident beliefs
while the agent is working. The sophisticated agent who faces the self-control
problem has an incentive to inflate her belief about her own ability for motivation
to resist the present temptation. Her payoff expectation is inevitably inflated
while she chooses to bias the perception about her ability upwardly. Instrumental
motive is gone after the working period and thus the agent’s beliefs become
unbiased afterwards.





Start End of Working Realisation
Figure 4.2: Dynamic overconfidence with instrumental motive only
4.3.4 A Nested Model
In this section, I nest consumption and instrumental motives into the benchmark
model. This is done because both consumption and instrumental motives may
affect the agent’s belief simultaneously and interdependently. At t = 1, the agent
chooses her belief in her ability θI = θ
β
for instrumental purpose. The subscript
|θI stands for the fact that the agent believes that her ability is θI at that time.
Then, she inflates her belief in the payoff for savouring. The ability distortion
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cost ψ < ψ̄ is fixed and the payoff distortion cost, λ(X1 − θI ln e)2, is quadratic.
The intrapersonal equilibrium of the nested model, {eN , XN1 , XN2 , XN3 }, is derived
from the following equations:
arg max
{e, X1}
UT1 |θI = −ce+βω2δUT2 +βω3δ2UT3 +sτ1X1−λ(X1 − θI ln e)2−ψ (4.18)
At t = 1, the agent anticipates that the optimal level of belief to hold are XN2 |θI
and XN3 |θI that:
arg max
X2
UT2 |θI = ω3δUT3 |θI + sτ2X2 − λ(X2 − θI ln(e))2 (4.19)
arg max
X3
UT3 |θI = θI ln(e)− λ(X3 − θI ln(e))2 (4.20)



































The main implications are summarised in the following section. Importantly,
XN2 |θI and XN3 |θI derived from the above equations are based on her belief that
her ability is θI at t = 1 and not equal to the actual equilibrium beliefs at t = 2
and t = 3. The actual equilibrium level of beliefs are derived at t = 2 and t = 3
where her belief about her ability is unbiased θ.
At t = 2, the agent has finished working and thus the instrumental motive no
longer presents. In other words, the agent is not incentivised to inflate her belief
about her ability to deal with the self-control problem. Therefore, she holds an
unbiased belief about θ. On the other hand, as she still savours the upcoming
payoff, consumption motive continues to affect her belief about the payoff.
arg max
X2





At t = 3, the agent has no time for savouring as τ3 = 0 and no need to deal
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with temptation as the effort is already exerted. Therefore, consistent with all
previous models, the agent’s confidence converges to the unbiased level as:
arg max
X3





















The above solution represents the actual equilibrium level of belief. Importantly,
the equilibrium result differs from XN2 |θI and XN3 |θI because the later two are
based on the belief that the agent’s ability is θI , however, when the agent enters
the waiting period, the perception about her ability becomes unbiased θ as in-
strumental motive no longer presents. Therefore, the intrapersonal equilibrium






























In this section, I analysis the main implications of the nested model. First,
overconfident beliefs arise in equilibrium due to consumption and instrumental
motives. Second, overconfident beliefs diminish over time and a substantial de-
crease is expected after the working period. Third, the equilibrium level of effort
is boosted by these two motives. Finally, compared to the single motive models,
the nested model shows that the interplay of these two motives further increases
the equilibrium level of effort and the degree of overconfidence.
12The proof is similar to that for the consumption motive equilibrium presented in Appendix
B.
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The Emergence and Motivation of Overconfidence
First, overconfidence is predicted by the present model even if belief distortion
is costly. Let DNt , the magnitude of belief bias (overconfidence), represents the


















> 0, DN2 =
sτ2
2λ
> 0 and DN3 = 0. And thus
the agent holds overconfident beliefs at both t = 1 and t = 2. The overconfidence
diminishes over time and the agent eventually holds an unbiased belief (DN3 = 0).
In addition to the emergence of overconfidence, this model shows that both con-
sumption motive and instrumental motive lead to overconfident belief on payoff




















Equation (4.27) has intuitive interpretation. First, the consumption motive is
positively driven by the net anticipatory parameter s since when savouring is
more important, agent chooses to bias her belief upwards more. On the other
hand, the consumption motive is negatively affected by λ: agent who is more
realism holds less overconfident belief in equilibrium as it is more costly to inflate
their beliefs. Second, the instrumental motive is negatively correlated with one’s
self-control ability β. Agent who suffers more from self-control problem holds
more overconfident belief because they require a stronger incentive to deal with
the temptation. Figure 4.3 presents the timing of these two motives.
The Dynamic of Overconfidence
The dynamic effect of the two motives leads to the dynamic of overconfidence
in equilibrium. The following equations show that the agent’s confidence level is
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Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
X1 X2 X3




























Equation (4.28) indicates that overconfidence diminishes over time. Figure 4.4
graphically shows the diminishing confidence level. The full line stands for the
confidence of the agent across time. The red vertical line represents the substan-
tial decrease in confidence after working as the instrumental motive disappears.
The dashed line is the unbiased level of confidence, and thus the area above
indicates overconfidence.
The Boost of Effort
Both consumption and instrumental motives increase the equilibrium level of ef-
fort. When the agent cares about the anticipatory utility, she chooses to work
more to savour the positive consequence of working. In addition, the agent man-
ages to deal with the self-control problem by believing that her effort provides
greater rewards. The magnitude of the boost is shown by:






(1− β)θδ2ω3(1 + ω2)
c
(4.29)




< 0. It is because the instrumental motive is of less importance
to the agent with greater self-control ability. In addition, the consumption mo-






Start End of Working Realisation
Figure 4.4: Dynamic overconfidence with consumption and instrumental motives
∂(eN−eweak)
∂s
> 0, because the agent who cares more about the anticipatory feelings
chooses to work more to savour the positive expectation.
The Interplay of Two Motives
Overconfidence caused by these two motives can be disentangled theoretically;
however, the interaction of these two motives further boosts the agent’s effort
and overconfidence. In a single motive model, the increases of effort are:
eC − eB = sθ(τ1 + δτ2ω2)
c




The effort increase of the nested model as shown in equation (4.29) can be rewrit-
ten as:
eN − eweak = (eC − eB) + (eI − eweak) + (1− β)sθτ1
βc
(4.31)
Therefore, compared with the single motive models, the equilibrium level of effort
in the nested model is further boosted by (1−β)sθτ1
βc
, which is negatively correlated
with self-control ability β and positively correlated with the savouring parameter
s. The basic idea behind the interplay is, as the agent believes her ability is
higher due to the instrumental motive, the payoff distortion becomes less costly
compared to the case of no ability distortion. Therefore, the agent is motivated
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to hold an even higher belief on the payoff, for which additional effort has to be
exerted in the equilibrium. In another word, the marginal cost of exerting effort
always equals the net marginal benefit of holding an inflated belief13. When the
net marginal benefit increases due to the instrumental motive, the equilibrium
effort also rises. Consequently, the degree of overconfidence is inflated by the
interplay since the effort is higher. This is shown in the following table.























D3 0 0 0 0
Table 4.1: The degree of overconfidence
Table 4.1 summarises the degree of overconfidence of different models at each
period. The first row of the table shows that the interplay of these two motives




1 . This is because
the effectiveness of the instrumental motive depends on the equilibrium level of
effort, which is further inflated by the interplay of the two motives.
Summary 3. Both consumption and instrumental motive lead to the emergence
of overconfident beliefs while she is working. At the same time, the agent works
more. After the working period, only consumption motive presents and keeps
motivating overconfident beliefs until the end of the waiting period. As a result,
the agent is most overconfident at the beginning of the working period and her
confidence level diminishes over time. Then a substantial decrease in confidence
occurs after the working period, after which her expectation continues to diminish
during the waiting period. In the end, her belief becomes unbiased. Also, com-
pared with the single motive models, the interplay of these two motives further
promotes effort and overconfidence.
4.4 Conclusion
The consumption and instrumental motives are proposed by economists to ex-
plain the prevalence of overconfidence. This chapter develops a simple theoretical
framework to model the dynamic of overconfidence. I argue that the dynamic of
overconfidence is predictable and is not necessarily caused by learning. Instead,
the degree of overconfidence depends on the waiting time until final payoff and
13The net marginal benefit of inflated belief is the marginal benefit from savouring minus
the distortion cost.
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the stage of working. For the consumption motive, the agent inflates her ex-
pectation more when there are more time and opportunities for savouring. For
the instrumental motive, the agent with self-control problem holds overconfident
beliefs while working. The dynamic overconfidence prediction is based on two
distinctive features of this model. First, I introduce a quadratic cost function
for belief distortion, which ensures that extreme beliefs are rare. Second, my
model includes an additional waiting stage which is very common in practice but
largely ignored by the literature. My model suggests that studies on overconfi-
dence should consider the fact that an individual potentially derives anticipatory
utility during the waiting stage.
The consumption and instrumental overconfidence suggest that overconfidence
is a form of self-deception. Individuals are self-deceptive towards inflated self-
judgement consciously or unconsciously. Three main types of tools are adopted
by individuals to achieve self-deceptive overconfidence: strategic ignorance, real-
ity denial and self-signalling (see, Bénabou & Tirole, 2016). However, empirical
evidence is limited in the existing literature. In Chapter 5, I provide some em-
pirical results on the intrapersonal overconfidence in the field of education.
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Appendices
A Proof of Benchmark Model Equilibrium








UT1 = −ce+ ω2δω3δθ ln(e) + ω3δ2θ ln(e) (32)













Let the first order derivative equal zero to get eB = θδ
2ω3(1+ω2)
c
and it is a local
maximum. In addition, given the constraint e ∈ (0,∞) is linear, the feasible
region is convex. Given the objective function is convex, the solution above is a
global maximum.
B Proof of Consumption Motive Equilibrium
To solve equation (4.6), (4.7) and (4.8), I first show that from equation (4.8),
XC3 = θ ln(e). That is, the optimal expectation to hold for the agent at t = 3,
is the unbiased belief. This result is intuitive since when there is no savouring
utility, there is no incentive for belief distortion.
Then we substitute XC3 = θ ln(e) into equation (4.7) to get:
arg max
X2
UT2 = ω3δθ ln(e) + sτ2X2 − λ(X2 − θ ln(e))2 (33)
Then take partial derivatives with respect to X2 to get:
∂UT2
∂X2
= sτ2 − 2λX2 + 2λθ ln(e)
∂2UT2
∂X22
= −2λ < 0
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+ θ ln(e) (34)
Equation 34 shows that the optimal expectation to hold at t = 2 is a best response
function to the effort exerted. Therefore, we are able to substitute equation 34
and XC3 = θ ln(e) into equation (4.6):
arg max
{e, X1}
UT1 = −ce+ ω2δ
[
ω3δθ ln(e) + sτ2(











+ sτ1X1 − λ(X1 − θ ln(e))2 (35)









= sτ1 − 2λX1 + 2λθ ln(e) = 0
Solving the above two equations to get the critical point:
eC =











































2ω3(1 + ω2) + sτ1)
e2
> 0




= sτ1−2λ(X1−θ ln(e)), underconfidence nor the unbiased
belief, X1 ≤ θ ln(e), is never optimal over the domain. Thus we can only focus
on the feasible sets where X1 > θ ln(e). Let det(Hi) be the determinants of










]2, simplify to get:
det(H2) =
2λθ[δsτ2ω2 + δ






= −2λ < 0






















> 0. Therefore, UT1 is strictly con-
cave over the domain {X1 > 0, e > 0, X1 > θ ln(e)} and thus {eC , XC1 } is a
global maximum over such domain.
C Proof of Instrumental Motive Equilibrium
Fixed ability distortion cost and the threshold ψ̄
In the face of the self-control problem, the agent decides whether or not to inflate
the belief about her own ability, given the belief distortion cost is ψ. To find the
solution, I first look at the case the agent does not adopt ability distortion due
to distortion cost (ψ is large), I = 0. If I = 0, the effort exerted is eweak. The
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welfare14 given no ability distortion is:










On the other hand, an agent may adopt ability distortion when the distortion
cost is reasonably low. For I = 1 her belief about her ability is θI and the utility
is thus:










Therefore, the agent chooses to inflate her belief about her own ability if and only
if W |I=1 −W |I=0 ≥ 015.
W |I=1 −W |I=0 = (β − 1− ln(β))δ2ω3θ(1 + ω2)− ψ (40)
Given 0 < β < 1, β − 1 − ln(β) > 0. Therefore, a positive threshold value,
ψ̄ = (β − 1 − ln(β))δ2ω3θ(1 + ω2), is identified. The agent will choose to inflate





the threshold value is negatively correlated with the agent’s self-control ability.
This result is intuitive in the sense that the agent with greater self-control ability
has less incentive to take a commitment device.
Quadratic ability distortion cost
In the previous part, I identify the threshold value of the fixed ability distortion
cost. In this part, I show that when the ability distortion cost is variable and
quadratic, the main message of the model does not change.
The ability distortion can be modeled in the same way as the payoff distortion.
The cost depends on the degree of distortion and the level of realism of the agent.
Let C(θ̂) be such cost, θ̂ be the distorted ability, then:
C(θ̂) = λ(θ̂ − θ)2 (41)
On the other hand, the benefit of ability distortion is through the lens of effort
14As mentioned in the main text, the welfare calculation does not take present bias into
consideration. Also, as it is ex-post utility, any distortions e.g. θ̂ do not affect the welfare
directly. I define U1 with β = 1 as the agent’s ex-post total welfare. The reason U1 represents
the total welfare level is because the definition of U1 has already takes the subsequent u2 and
U3 into consideration through the weighting parameter ω2 and ω3.
15Clearly the conduct of the commitment device (ability distortion) requires some level of
self-control ability. In the paper I assume the agent is able to successfully commit if it is
beneficial.
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boost, which increases the ex-post welfare for the agent with self-control problem.
Let B(θ̂) represent the benefit of ability distortion, which is the difference between
the ex-post welfare Wθ̂ −Wθ.
B(θ̂) = Wθ̂ −Wθ
Wθ̂ = −ce









− λ(θ̂ − θ)2










Therefore the agent chooses the degree of distortion θ̂ − θ to maximise the net





= 2λ(θ̂ − θ) > 0 (43)
The marginal cost is straightforward to get and it is positive and increasing with
the degree of the distortion. The marginal benefit is the marginal increase in the



















δ3ω23θ(1 + ω2)(ω2 + δ)
ce








First, the above equation shows ∂e
θ̂
∂θ̂
> 0, that is, the equilibrium level of effort is
positively correlated with the magnitude of belief inflation. The more competent
the agent believes she is, the more effort she should exert in terms of the ex-post
welfare. Second, the marginal benefit diminishes as e increases, since:
∂MB
∂e






= −2δ3ω23θ(1 + ω2)(ω2 + δ) < 0
(45)
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Therefore, we can conclude that the marginal benefit is diminishing with the
degree of ability distortion θ̂−θ. So the problem is a standard increasing marginal





δω3θ(ω2 + δ)− ceθ̂
]
ceθ̂
= 2λ(θ̂ − θ)
θ̂ = θ +
δ2ω3(1 + ω2)
[




Substitute eθ̂ = θ̂δ
2ω3(1+ω2)
c
into the above equation:
θ̂ = θ +
√
8(1− δ)δλω2ω3θ + [δ2ω3(1 + ω2) + 2λθ]2 − δ2ω3(1 + ω2)− 2λθ
4λ
(47)
As 8(1 − δ)δλω2ω3θ > 0, θ̂ > θ. Thus my model also predicts the emergence of
overconfidence with a quadratic ability distortion cost.
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CHAPTER 5 MOTIVATED OVERCONFIDENCE: AN
ONLINE FIELD STUDY
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 4, I develop a simple theoretical model on motivated overconfidence.
The main aim of this chapter is to provide an empirical test on the validity of the
proposed consumption and instrumental motives behind overconfidence. While
the idea of motivated overconfidence appears to be theoretically convincing, I am
not aware of any empirical studies verifying the existence of these two motives.
The lack of experimental evidence is likely to be caused by the challenging nature
of the problem. Empirical research (e.g. traditional laboratory experiments) on
motivated overconfidence is difficult to conduct for a number of reasons. First,
it is often demanding to separate the effect of the consumption (savoury) motive
and the instrumental motive. Both motives cause overconfidence but through
fundamentally different channels. Just observing whether or to what extent one
is overconfident does not help to identify the underlying motives. A successful
study must be able to separate these two effects. Second, high stakes might
be necessary to trigger cognitive distortions. An individual is likely to distort
her belief to resist present temptation if the self-control problem is significantly
costly. Similarly, for the consumption motive, small stakes (e.g. £20 rewards in
a laboratory experiment) are unlikely to induce any significant savouring utility.
Third, a long waiting period before the reward is required to study the savouring
behaviour and the experimenter has to collect the individual’s beliefs multiple
times across time to observe the dynamics of overconfidence predicted in theory.
Such design features (long delay of payment, subjects called to the lab multiple
times) are often costly and impractical to implement in a lab.
With this chapter, I intend to contribute to the literature empirically and method-
ologically with a novel design of an online field study. A total of three online
surveys are delivered to students completing a compulsory economics coursework
to measure their grade expectation.1 All three surveys ask students to self-report
their current best prediction about their essay performance. The three surveys
are delivered at the following periods: the first is when students start working
on the essay, the second is when students have just submitted their work, and
the third one is just before result realisation. This design overcomes the above
difficulties. First, the timing of the surveys, together with the nature of the task,
1Detailed questions are available upon request.
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help to separate the potential consumption and instrumental motives. Second,
this study recruits highly motivated students from a leading research university in
the UK. The compulsory coursework essay contributes to their final grade signif-
icantly, and thus subjects care about their essay performance. Third, we collect
subjects’ self-reported expectations through the online learning platform “Black-
board Learn”, which is being used on a daily basis by the students. Therefore,
the subjects can participate easily, and their responses are kept at a secure place
in an anonymous way.
The data of this study suggests that students hold dynamic beliefs about their es-
say performance. Although absolute overconfidence is absent, students are most
confident about their performance while working. Then after submission, stu-
dents, especially those who have a greater degree of self-control problem, adjust
their expectations downwards significantly. Then the confidence level stays un-
changed until result realisation. The dynamics of the confidence level is consistent
with a possibility that students adopt inflated beliefs as a motivator to pursue
difficult goals, providing an experimental support for the instrumental motive of
overconfidence. In contrast, the consumption motive hypothesis is not compat-
ible with the data. Students do not hold higher expectations while waiting for
result realisation.
5.2 Literature Review
In Chapter 4 of this thesis, I summarise the literature on motivated overconfidence
theory, as well as general empirical evidence on the existence of overconfidence.
In this section, I focus on the experimental evidence on student overconfidence.
In the economics of education literature, overconfidence is often studied through
the lens of grade forecasts.2 Numerous research studies have found that students,
in general, are overconfident about their academic performance both relatively
and absolutely. I begin with the most closely related one. Grimes (2002) finds
that students’ performance forecasts are subject to a pervasive degree of over-
confidence. In his study, self-reported expectations about the exam performance
2Apart from grade forecasts, student overconfidence has been found from a number of other
perspectives. Students hold overconfident beliefs on the insightfulness of their own judgments,
examples including answering general knowledge questions (Fischhoff et al., 1977) and fore-
casting what events they will experience during the semester (Dunning et al., 1991). College
students also tend to believe that they are above average in desirable abilities (Dunning et
al., 2004). Also, students overestimate the probability that their own future decisions will be
socially desirable, while their expectations regarding other students’ pro-social behaviour are
more accurate (Epley & Dunning, 2000, 2006).
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are collected at three points in time: 48 hours before the exam, just before the
exam and just after the exam. Students’ forecasts are significantly higher than
their actual performance for all three surveys. However, the performance expec-
tation becomes much lower (yet still overconfident) for the post-exam survey.3
Moreland & Sweeney (1984) conducted a survey-based study with undergraduate
students and found that students have a strong general preference for positive
rather performance evaluations regardless of their self-expectancies. They be-
lieve their result might be explained by the self-enhancement effects (e.g. Cohen,
1959; Brown et al., 1988) that people react favourably to positive performance
evaluations to enhance their self-image.
Grimes et al. (2004) also find evidence for the existence of student overconfidence,
as more than 70 percent of the students predict that their exam score higher than
what they achieve. Serra & DeMarree (2016) collect students’ reports on the de-
sired level of performance and grade forecasts. Consistent overconfidence is iden-
tified and they argue that it is because students’ predictions are biased towards
their desired level of performance. Students also consistently overestimate how
easily they can complete academic tasks, a phenomenon named “planning fallacy”
(Buehler et al., 1994). For example, the amount of time undergraduate students
spend to complete their thesis is three weeks longer than their self-reported most
“realistic” estimation, and one week more than what they believe as the “worst
case” scenario.
Also, heterogeneous patterns of student overconfidence have been identified by
earlier studies. Specifically, male students tend to be more overconfident than
female students, and weak students are more overconfident than strong students.
Lundeberg et al. (1994) find that while both male and female students overesti-
mate their academic performance, males are much more overconfident especially
when their answers are wrong. Their finding is consistent with “the male answer
syndrome”, whereby men tend to have opinions even on subjects they do not have
any ideas about (Campbell, 1992). In general, the literature suggests that male
students are more overconfident, however, the gender difference in confidence can
3There are three key differences between Grimes (2002) and the present study. First, the
present study collect students’ grade expectations across a much longer time, which is important
to explore the self-control related problems (e.g. students are much less likely to suffer from
the self-control problems during the last 48 hours until exam). Second, the consumption and
instrumental motives are indistinguishable in Grimes (2002) because of the short observation
time and because students’ expectations are not collected close to result realisation. Third, the
drop in confidence after the exam in Grimes (2002) might be caused by students changing their
perceptions about the difficulty of the exam. On the other hand, the present study excludes
this possibility because essay questions are announced much earlier.
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be task dependent.4 Similarly in Nowell & Alston (2007), overconfident grade
expectations are observed, and male students are more overconfident than female
peers. In addition, they find that weak students with lower GPAs exhibit greater
overconfidence than strong students. Students in lower division classes have a
greater tendency to hold overconfident expectations than do those in upper divi-
sion classes.
The phenomena that weak students are more overconfident has also been sup-
ported by several other studies (e.g. Sinkavich, 1995; Grimes, 2002; Edwards et
al., 2003; Lindsey & Nagel, 2015). It is believed to be caused by the Dunning-
Kruger effect that low-skilled students lack not only the content knowledge but
also the metacognitive skills that would allow them to appreciate their lack of
content knowledge (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). In other words, incompetent in-
dividuals often fail to know how deficient their performance is, and thus hold
overconfident beliefs. Empirical evidence on the Dunning-Kruger effect is preva-
lent in the education literature (e.g. Dunning et al., 2003; Dunlosky & Metcalfe,
2008; Bell & Volckmann, 2011).5 The observed overconfidence among students
may be different across cultures. For example, although Americans and West-
ern Europeans tend to believe themselves as above average along almost every
desirable dimension, subjects from East Asia do not (Heine et al., 1999, 2001).
Therefore, the generality of the overconfidence in education across cultures is not
a given fact. Also, Dunning et al. (2004) argue that the presence of one aspect
of overconfidence in one culture does not necessarily imply that people with such
cultural background are overconfident in all aspects. For example, although East-
ern subjects do not hold the above-average beliefs, studies suggest that Eastern
students tend to be more overconfident about the accuracy of their judgments
than American students (Yates et al., 1997).
Evidence suggests that students often lack the self-control ability to implement
study plans. Duckworth & Seligman (2005) find that for adolescents, the de-
4A number of studies compare the behavioural differences between male and female in both
math and word tasks. The main finding is that males are more confident when competing for
math tasks, but not for word tasks (for a review see, Niederle & Vesterlund, 2011).
5It should also be noted that the existence of the Dunning-Kruger effect has been challenged
by several studies, for example Burson et al. (2006) find that individuals across all ability
levels have similar degrees of unawareness of their ability. Clayson (2005) argues that the
student overconfidence is caused by a systematic effect relating to students past experience and
expectations, not by the metacognitive effects of the Dunning-Kruger effect. Also, Krajc &
Ortmann (2008) states that the fact that low-skilled individuals are more overconfident can
be a result of “floor” effects. On the other hand, Schlösser et al. (2013) reply to the above
challenges and confirm the overall validity of the Dunning-Kruger effect.
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gree of self-discipline accounts for more than twice as much variance as IQ in
many aspects of academic performance. Numerous empirical tests have been
conducted and the correlation between the student’s self-control ability and her
academic success is robust (e.g., Allan & Lonigan, 2011; Véronneau et al., 2014;
Duckworth & Carlson, 2015; Duckworth et al., 2016). These studies suggest
that the lack of self-discipline is a major reason for students failing in academic
challenges. Given the significant negative consequences of the self-control prob-
lem, behavioural economists argue that individuals who lack self-control may use
commitment devices to pursue long-term goals. Examples of the commitment
devices include self-imposed deadlines (Ariely & Wertenbroch, 2002), long-term
membership contracts (DellaVigna & Malmendier, 2006), saving in the face of
negative interest rate (Besley, 1995) and pre-purchased fertilizer coupons (Duflo
et al., 2011). Bryan et al. (2010) summarise the commitment devices into two
groups, hard commitments and soft commitments. Hard commitments involve
real economic penalties for failure or rewards for success, on the other hand, soft
commitments are motivated by psychological factors. Specifically, in the educa-
tion context, a commonly used hard commitment is scholarships or other forms
of financial support. However, the efficiency of imposing financial incentives on
students is challenged by many studies.6
In Chapter 4 of this thesis, being overconfident about one’s ability is proposed
as a soft commitment device. In the present chapter, I aim to provide some sup-
porting evidence. Another soft commitment, goal setting behaviour in education
has been studied by many researchers. performance-based goal setting (e.g. a
student self-initiate or set by teachers a goal on her exam performance) is com-
monly studied among education psychologists and a positive correlation between
goal setting and academic performance is identified (e.g., Harackiewicz et al.,
1997; Elliot & McGregor, 2001; Darnon et al., 2009). However, a recent study
by D. Clark et al. (2017) finds that performance-based goals have positive but
statistically insignificant effects on academic performance through a large scale
field experiment. On the other hand, D. Clark et al. (2017) argue that task-based
goals (e.g. a student who self-initiates or set by teachers a goal on how many
course tasks to be completed) are much more effective than performance-based
goals through the channel that task-based goals increase the completion of course
tasks.
6Despite the fact that financial programs are costly, one key problem is that monetary
rewards may crowd out the intrinsic incentives to study (Gneezy et al., 2011). Also, many
studies suggest that the effect of such programs are insignificant (for a review, see Koch et al.,
2015).
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It should be noted that, apart from motivated overconfidence argument, the ob-
served overconfident beliefs held by students might be potentially explained by
other theories. Wishful thinking might be one reason why students hold un-
realistic optimistic beliefs about their performance. Psychological studies com-
monly believe wishful thinking is the outcome of a conflict between a desire to
have an accurate picture of the world an a desire to reach a ‘directional’ (often
overoptimistic) conclusion (Kunda, 1990). Economists generally follow a similar
approach, viewing wishful thinking as part of a strategy to balance the gain from
positive feelings against the cost in biased decisions (Akerlof & Dickens, 1982;
Brunnermeier & Parker, 2005). Mayraz (2011) finds evidence for wishful think-
ing in a lab and Serra & DeMarree (2016) argues that wishful thinking might be
able to explain the overconfident grade forecasts reported by students. However,
theories of wishful thinking are incapable to explain the time-varying perspective
of our data.
Learning with new information might potentially explain the fact that students
hold dynamic beliefs about their performance. If students do not have perfect
information about the difficulty of the coursework nor their ability, they may
initially hold inaccurate beliefs and update their beliefs with new information.
For example in our case, through working on the essay, students may be better
informed and adjust their beliefs about their performance. There are empirical
evidence that students do not understand the marking system or do not know
how to achieve a better academic outcome (e.g., Garner, 1990; D. Clark et al.,
2017). There are also evidence that students might be able to adjust their expec-
tations with new information. Magnus & Peresetsky (2017) found evidence that
students, especially female students, were able to adjust their performance expec-
tations on future exams according to their past exam results. Such learning story
is unlikely to explain our data for two reasons. First, from the survey response,
we do not find evidence that students believe that the difficulty of the coursework
is increasing while working. Second, our data contradicts the existing empirical
finding that female students learn more successfully than male students. There-
fore in summary, the motivated overconfidence theory best explain our empirical
observation.
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5.3 Design of the Field Study
5.3.1 Description of the course and sample
The present field study was conducted at a leading research university in the
UK. All students in this study were enrolled in a year-long either first or second
year core economics course (Econ 1 and Econ 2, respectively). Both courses are
worth 20 ECTS Credits7, which is twice compared to a standard course. These
courses are compulsory for economics students and they are required to achieve
at least 50% to progress and are thus, the most important courses for year 1
and year 2 economics students. Both courses require students to submit a 1,500
words essay, and the essay mark is a significant component of their final grade.
Participation in this study is completely voluntary, and we sought consent from
all subjects before the start of the experiment. We employed a within-subjects
design: subjects are asked to complete three online surveys at different points
of time. Students are not informed the details of the following surveys. Three
groups of students are invited: (1) Students taking the course Econ 1 in 2015-
2016 academic year (henceforth, Econ1a); (2) Students taking the course Econ 2
in 2015-2016 academic year (henceforth, Econ2); (3) Students taking the course
Econ 1 in 2016-2017 academic year (henceforth, Econ1b). Table 1 provides basic
statistics about our subjects for each group.
5.3.2 Online Learning Platform
Our online surveys are conducted through the online learning platform, Black-
board Learn. Students are familiar with its interface and use this platform for
most academic activities from downloading course materials to submitting es-
says/tests. I use this platform to conduct this online study mainly because
it supports a within-subject survey design. As described in the following sub-
section, the study contains three surveys in total and Blackboard Learn makes
it possible to identify the responses made by the same subjects.8 In addition,
performance data, such as tutorial attendance records and exam scores are also
stored in this platform, which assists our analysis.9 Furthermore, compared to
standard classroom experiments, our online experiment ensures privacy and min-
7The corresponding total study hours, including lectures, tutorials and independent studies,
are 400 hours.
8All the data presented to the author is completely anonymous, and the data collection
process complied with university ethics policy.
9Consent from participants is collected with the approval from the ethics committee of the
university.
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imizes potential communication and the social pressure raised during standard
classroom experiments.
5.3.3 The Surveys
Our experiment is made with a total of three online surveys, denoted as Survey
1, Survey 2 and Survey 3. Email invitations were sent to all students taking the
corresponding course. The main question of interest is about their expectation on
their essay performance. In addition, the surveys collected information related
to essay performance, such as language and experience of essay writing were
collected. Moreover, we asked questions related to their individual characteristics
such as their self-control ability. The timing of the surveys are: the first survey
is released three weeks prior to the essay deadline and is available for 7 days;
the second survey is released just after the essay deadline and is available for 7
days; the third survey is released two days prior to the essay marks release and
is available until essay marks release. The timing and availability of the surveys
are presented in Figure 5.1.
Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 3
Topics Release
5 weeks before deadline
Deadline Marks Release
3 weeks after deadline
Figure 5.1: Timeline and Availability of the Surveys
Note: The blue rectangles represent the starting and finishing dates of the surveys.
Printing credits and Amazon vouchers were provided as incentives for participa-
tion. Two slightly different types of incentives are provided. For Econ1a and
Econ2 (academic year 2015-2016) students, they were promised to share a total
of 40 £10 printing credits and 5 £50 Amazon vouchers. For Econ1b (academic
year 2016-2017) students, they were promised to get £5 printing credit for sure
if they complete all three surveys and enter a draw for 1 £50 Amazon voucher.
As Table 5.1 suggests, providing certain rewards might be better at motivating
students for participation. Participates are informed that the compensation they
receive depends exclusively on completion and does not depend on the responses
they submit. The reason not to provide incentives for accurate expectation is that
students can be both conscious and unconscious about the belief distortion due
to instrumental and consumption motives (Burks et al., 2013; Bénabou & Tirole,
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2016). If financial incentives are provided for accurate beliefs, students who are
conscious of the fact that they hold inflated beliefs may have incentives to submit
a lower response, yet still adopt inflated beliefs as motivation or consumption. In
other words, if such incentives were provided, we would only observe the cognitive
distortions possessed by unconscious students.10
Table 5.1 presents a summary of the number of participants. The fraction of
students who complete all three surveys is not high since the third survey was
available for a short time only and voluntary participation is emphasised. There-
fore, in order to utilise the most of the observations, students who complete two
surveys are also included in the analysis when it is possible.11
All Econ1a Econ1b Econ2
Total No. of students 1,034 360 386 288
Students complete at least one survey 441 143 184 114
Students complete all three surveys 150 34 82 34
Table 5.1: Number of Participants
5.4 Theoretical Prediction
The structure of the present online experiment follows closely to the motivated
overconfidence theory proposed in Chapter 4. Consistent with chapter 4, I denote
the expectations about their essay performance at survey 1, 2 and 3 as X1, X2,
X3 respectively. Table 5.2 summaries the main theoretical predictions. Details
are presented in Chapter 4. Based on the theory, I list three main hypotheses of
interest, and these hypotheses are tested in the next section.
Hypothesis 1. X2 > X3. Subjects’ expectations are affected by the consumption
motive.
Hypothesis 2. X1 > X2. Subjects’ expectations are affected by the instrumental
motive.
Hypothesis 3. D1 is negatively correlated with Self-control problem. Subjects
with lower self-control ability inflate their beliefs to a greater extent while working.
10Indeed, providing financial incentives for accurate grade expectation can potentially be an
interesting extension to study whether overconfident students are aware of their optimism.




No motives No No No X1 = X2 = X3
Consumption only Yes Yes No X1 > X2 > X3
Instrumental only Yes No No X1 > X2 = X3
Both motives Yes Yes No X1 >> X2 > X3
Table 5.2: Theoretical Predictions
Note: X1 >> X2 > X3 stands for the fact that if both consumption and instrumental motives
present, the theory predicts a significant decrease from X1 to X2, while a smaller drop from X2
to X3.
5.5 Results
The main purpose of this paper is to test the theory of consumption and in-
strumental motives of confidence. Specifically, it addresses the following two
questions. Does the data support the existence of a consumption motive or an
instrumental motive or both? Does the data help to reject alternative stories?
A number of hypotheses are proposed to answer these two main questions. In
this section, I first describe the main descriptive statistics of the data. Then,
statistical tests results are presented, and the hypotheses are examined.
5.5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 5.3 and Figure 5.2 present the descriptive statistics on the expectations
that students submit in three surveys. First of all, in contrast to most earlier
studies, students in this study do not overestimate their essay grade even when
they are most optimistic. Second, students are most confident while working
on their essay, become less confident after submission and continuing holding
such level of confidence till result realisation. Therefore, students seem to hold a
dynamic view about their essay performance, and the same pattern applies to all
three samples.
5.5.2 Main Findings
The first question to investigate is whether students in our sample inflate their
expectations for the savouring purpose. As presented in Table 5.2, if the consump-
tion motive presents, students hold a higher expectation at the time of survey 2
than survey 3 since there is no time for savouring at the time of survey 3. The
summary statistics table and figure above suggest that X2 ≈ X3, statistical tests
and detailed within-subject scatter plots further confirm that there is no statis-
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X1 X2 X3 Real Score (N=150) Real Score (all students)
Econ1a 65.41 63.11 63.82 64.94 61.44
Econ1b 62.88 59.99 59.65 63.45 61.53
Econ2 60.68 57.44 57.53 60.68 59.63
Total 62.95 60.12 60.11 63.16 60.94
Table 5.3: Summary Statistics Table
Note: Scores are percentage grades using the system that is common among UK universities:
<40, Fail; 40-49, D; 50-59, C; 60-69, B; >70, A. Typically, the mean and median marks are
close to each other and are between 55 and 65.
The first four columns, (X1, X2, X3 and Real Score (N=150)), are based on the data of the
150 students who complete all three surveys. The last column presents the average real score
of all students who submitted the essay. Students who complete all three surveys have a better
real score on average. Details can be found in Table 5A.7 in Appendix A.
tical difference between X2 and X3. In other words, the data in this study does
not support the presence of the consumption motive of overconfidence.
Table 5.4 shows that, at the aggregate level, there is no statistical difference
between X2 and X3 for each three individual samples and the aggregate. Non-
parametric statistical results based on 173 subjects who complete both survey 1
and survey 2 suggest that the mean of X2 and X2 are of no difference.
12 Similar
results are presented at the individual level in Figure 5.3. In this figure, the
location of each scatter point represents one subject’s submitted expectations
in survey 2 and survey 3. Specifically, the vertical axis stands for X2 and the
horizontal axis represents for X3. Therefore, if the consumption motive presents
and thus X2 > X3, these scatter points should be, on average, located above the
45 ◦ line. On the other hand, the data shows that the scatter points are located
around the 45 ◦ line. In other words, students do not hold higher expectations
in survey 2 compared to survey 3. Therefore, the data does not support the
existence of the consumption motive and Hypothesis 1 is rejected.
H1 : X2 > X3
Wilcoxon signed-rank Sign (X2 > X3) Sign (X2 6= X3) N
Econ1a 0.09* 0.98 0.11 41
Econ1b 0.81 0.56 >0.99 87
Econ2 0.99 0.50 >0.99 45
Total 0.81 0.82 0.47 173
Table 5.4: H1: Tests of the Consumption Motive
Note: p-values are reported for each test. p < 0.1, *; p < 0.05, **; p < 0.01, ***
Finding 1. Hypothesis 1 is rejected and no consumption motive is identified.


















































































Survey 1           Survey 2           Survey 3
Total
Expectations and Real Scores
Figure 5.2: Graphical Summary Statistics
Note: The horizontal red dashed lines stand for the average real scores. The bars represent
the students’ expectations at each point of time. Specifically, the dark grey, light grey and light
blue bars represent the level of expectations at survey 1, survey 2 and survey 3 respectively.
Total number of subjects, N=150.
The motivated overconfidence theory suggests that the instrumental effect of
overconfidence helps individuals to exert more effort while working. Specifically in
this study, if students distort their beliefs due to instrumental reasons, X1 > X2.
13
Table 5.5 indicates that at the aggregate level, X1 is significantly higher than X2
for all three samples and the aggregate. Figure 5.4 confirms the finding that
X1 > X2 from the individual perspective. In this scatter plot, it can be observed
that more points are located above the 45◦ line. Thus more students hold inflated
beliefs while working on the essay and many of them adjust their expectations
downwards significantly after submission. The result that X1 > X2 suggests a
possibility that students adopt inflated beliefs for motivation.
Finding 2. Hypothesis 2 is not rejected and instrumental motive is likely to be
effective.
A further investigation about the presence of the instrumental motive is through
the lens of the self-control problem. As predicted by the theory, the instrumental
motive is adopted as a commitment device to deal with the self-control problem,
13Theoretically, the gap between X1 and X2 is caused by both the withdraw of the instru-
mental motive and the decrease in the consumption motive. However, given the data strongly
rejects the existence of the consumption motive, the difference between X1 and X2 is likely to
be driven exclusively by the instrumental motive.
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Figure 5.3: H1: Scatter Plots of X2 and X3
Note: The vertical axis stands for the value of the students’ expectation at survey 2 (X2) and
the horizontal axis for survey 3 (X3) . The blue dashed line is the 45
◦ line. The locations of
the scatter points are slightly jittered to present the distribution density.
H2 : X1 > X2
Wilcoxon signed-rank Sign (X1 > X2) Sign (X1 6= X2) N
Econ1a 0.02** <0.01*** <0.01*** 51
Econ1b <0.01*** <0.01*** <0.01*** 101
Econ2 <0.01*** <0.01*** <0.01*** 47
Total <0.01*** <0.01*** <0.01*** 199
Note: p-values are reported for each test. p < 0.1, *; p < 0.05, **; p < 0.01, ***.
Table 5.5: H2: Tests of the Instrumental Motive
and in equilibrium, the extent of belief inflation is negatively correlated with the
individual’s self-control ability because individuals with high self-control ability
do not need much belief inflation to exert the optimal level of effort. Clearly, if
a student has perfect self-discipline (and thus does not suffer from present bias),
she has no incentive to adopt any commitment devices. Therefore, if the drop
between X1 and X2 is due to the disappearance of the instrumental motive, we
should be able to observe that students with lower self-control abilities adjust
their beliefs downward to a greater extent.
Let D1 = X1−X2 be the drop of confidence after submission. Figure 5.5 presents
the distribution of D1, and it is clear that for all samples, students on average ad-
just their expectations downwards after submission. Specifically for the aggregate
sample (N=199), 27.6% of the students report the same level of expectations in
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Figure 5.4: H2: Scatter Plots of X1 and X2
Note: The vertical axis stands for the value of the students’ expectation at survey 1 (X1) and
the horizontal axis for survey 2 (X2) . The blue dashed line is the 45
◦ line. The locations of
the scatter points are slightly jittered to present the distribution density.
survey 1 and survey 2; 54.3% of the students submit lower expectations in survey 2
than in survey 1, and the remaining 18.1% of the subjects become more confident
after the submission. To test whether D1 is correlated with the degree of the self-
control problem, survey 2 incorporates questions about their desired level of effort
and their actual level of effort.14 Thus, the self-reported degree of self-control
problem (SCP ) is defined as the difference between the planned total hours and
the actual hours working on the essay (SCP = hour planned − hour worked).
Regression results from Table 5.6 suggest a significant positive correlation be-
tween the drop of confidence after submission and the degree of the self-control
problem. In other words, the data supports a possibility that the instrumental
motive is more likely to be adopted by students with greater self-control problems
as a commitment device.
Table 5.6 reports OLS regressions of the difference between X1 and X2 on stu-
dents characteristics and their self-reported degree of self-control. In the first
column, student characteristics including gender and exam performance15 are re-
gressed. The result suggests that female students change their beliefs significantly
14The level of effort is measured in terms of time (how many hours are spent on working on
the essay).
15Students taking Econ 1 and Econ 2 are required to take one mid-term exam and one class
exam prior to the coursework essay period. These two exams contribute to their final grade
and the variable “Exam Performance” is the average of these two exams.
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Figure 5.5: H3: Histogram of the Decrease in Expectations
Note: The vertical axis stands for the density of the distribution and the horizontal axis is D1,
the difference between X1 and X2. The vertical dashed indicates the mean of the distribution.
less before/after submission. Since evidence on gender differences in education
indicates that females have better self-control abilities (e.g. Duckworth & Selig-
man, 2006), female students may be less incentivised to adopt the inflated beliefs
as a commitment device and thus do not adjust their expectations as much as
their male peers. In the second column, an additional variable about the stu-
dent’s self-control ability is introduced. The result suggests that students with a
greater degree of self-control problem inflate their expectations more while work-
ing. Such finding is consistent with the theoretical prediction that individuals
with self-control problems inflate their expectations while working to deal with
the present temptations. Column three and four provide further evidence on the
correlation between the expectation gap and the self-control problem for each
gender. Results indicate that the correlation is valid for both male and female
students.
Finding 3. Hypothesis 3 is not rejected, and students with greater self-control
problem inflate their expectations more while working.
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Dependent Variable: D1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Total Male Female
DFemale -3.04*** -2.49**
(1.06) (1.07)
Exam Performance -0.02 0.00 -0.06 0.08
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
DEcon 2 2.47 2.04 0.99 2.61
(1.54) (1.53) (2.24) (2.08)
DEcon 1b 0.97 0.45 -0.52 1.66
(1.29) (1.29) (1.79) (1.84)
Self-control Problem 1.02*** 1.10* 0.88*
(0.38) (0.59) (0.50)
Constant 4.22* 1.97 6.53* -5.40*
(2.31) (2.43) (3.49) (3.17)
Observations 195 194 102 92
Table 5.6: Determinants of the Confidence Drop
Note: Variables starts with “D” are dummy variables. DFemale with base male students being
0. DEcon 2 and DEcon 1b are student samples with base sample Econ 1a being 0.
Among the 195 students who submitted expectations in survey 1 and survey 2, one subject did
not answer the self-control questions and thus excluded from regression (2).
OLS regressions standard errors are reported in the brackets. p < 0.1, *; p < 0.05, **; p < 0.01,
***.
5.6 Discussion
Several alternative hypotheses seem to be convincing at explaining the data of this
study. In this section, I explain why these alternative explanations are unlikely
to be valid.
5.6.1 Learning
An alternative argument regarding the drop in expectation after submission is
that students may have learned new information during this period. Students
may adjust their expectations based on new information about the task or signals
affecting their metacognition.16 Although it is difficult to rule out these learning
effects completely, a number of reasons below suggest that learning may not play
a key role in the drop in expectations before/after submission.
The nature of the essay-writing task prohibits excessive learning during the writ-
16For example, students may find fault in their submitted work while communicating with
other students and become less confident. Alternatively, they may adjust their expectation
downwards simply because they realise that they have imperfect self-control ability (and thus
work less than expected).
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ing period. The essay questions do not have clear-cut right or wrong answers, and
students are less likely to update from social learning as it is difficult to assess
the quality of one’s essay. In comparison, many exam questions have a simple
model answer, which makes students much easier to learn by themselves or from
communicating with their peers. In addition, there is no uncertainty about the
questions and thus no surprise for students. The essay topic is certain and stu-
dents can choose the one they are more familiar with. On the other hand, the
pre/post exam confidence dynamics observed by earlier studies are likely to be
a result of learning.17 Furthermore, the essay task provides little feedback until
result realisation. In contrast to an exam for which students often get adequate
feedback from quiz and textbooks, almost no official feedback is available until
the result realisation. Students submit their work by sending their files online
and no feedback of any form is generated after submission.
The data in the present study contradicts the findings on the persistence of expec-
tations with learning. A large number of studies on grade expectations suggest
that students do not adjust their expectations with respect to new information
(e.g. Murstein, 1965; Serra & DeMarree, 2016; Foster et al., 2017), which in-
dicates the drop in expectation may not be a result of learning. Also, a few
studies report that women tend to be more flexible in revising their expectations
with more experience (e.g. Grimes, 2002; Magnus & Peresetsky, 2017). However,
in the present study, males are much more flexible in terms of adjusting grade
expectations.
The naivety about one’s self-control ability is unlikely to explain the present
data. A slightly alternative learning argument may argue that students decrease
their expectation because they learned the fact that they suffer from the present
temptation. In other words, students are naive about their self-discipline at the
beginning of the task and eventually learn the fact. Given the fact that Econ
2 students all have completed Econ 1, if the naivety and learning argument is
valid, Econ 2 students should be less naive compared with Econ 1 students due
to additional experience. Consequently, Econ 2 students should reduce their
expectations less than Econ 1 students. However, in the data, Econ 2 students
on average adjust their expectations more than Econ 1 students.18
17Students after taking exams may update their grade expectations because the questions
are different from her expectation. Examples include “I didn’t expect this type of questions”,
“The questions are (not) what I’ve prepared”.
18The average gap (D1) for Econ 1 students is 2.63 and for Econ 2 students is 3.66. The
difference in the gap between Econ 1 and Econ 2 is not significant (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
and Kolmogorov-Smirnov).
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5.6.2 Inexperience and the Perception of Difficulty
As presented in Figure 5.2, Econ 2 students (with more experience) on average
adjust their beliefs to a greater extent. The perception of the difficulty of the
task is collected in the survey. Specifically, the question asks if students feel the
difficulty of the essay changes over time. Among the 118 students who complete
this question19, 28.0% of the subjects feel that the essay is getting more difficult
while working; 21.2% believe the essay becomes easier and the remaining 50.9%
do not hold dynamic perceptions of the difficulty of the task. Therefore, the
change in expectations is unlikely to be caused by the change in the perception
of difficulty. Table A shows that students who complete all three surveys have a
better academic performance than others.
5.7 Conclusion
This paper empirically tests whether overconfidence is driven by consumption and
instrumental motives. By collecting students’ grade forecasts at different points
of time, this design allows me to disentangle these two motives. The findings
suggest that, in order to deal with present temptation, students are likely to
adopt an inflated belief while working. On the other hand, overconfidence does
not present during the waiting period, and it indicates that the consumption
motive is unlikely to be effective. To the best of my knowledge, this paper presents
the first experimental support for the instrumental argument of overconfidence.
Consistent with the theory, female students and those with better self-control
abilities inflate their beliefs less while working.
One limitation of this study is that I cannot tell to what extent the inflated be-
liefs are effective at motivating students. It is difficult to compare the level of
effort with/without belief distortion for the same subject. Also, the data cannot
explain exactly why some students do not adopt inflated beliefs. It might just
because those students have enough self-control ability or are realistic. Alterna-
tively, those who do not distort beliefs may not be aware of the existence of such
commitment device. The finding that second year students have a larger decrease
in expectations after submission might suggest that some students are learning
with experience to adopt inflated beliefs as a commitment tool. Psychologists
have found that self-efficacy training is indeed helpful in a number of situations
including working performance and disease fighting (e.g. Gist et al., 1989; Eden
& Aviram, 1993; Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998). Thus, students might learn to be
19This question is only available to Econ 1b students.
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overconfident for the instrumental purpose.
The findings of this paper are in line with the general argument that people
can manipulate their beliefs for a purpose. Recent biological findings on the
“open-label placebo effect” suggest that patients report better feelings by taking
ineffective placebos (e.g. sugar pills) knowing what they really are (e.g. Berry-
Kravis et al., 2009; Kelley et al., 2012). These results indicate a paradoxical result.
On the one hand, people are successful at manipulating their beliefs (e.g. reality
denial) to improve welfare. On the contrary, it seems that cognitive distortions
are heavily constrained, and have to be triggered by a sense of ceremony or
licensing.20 Future research in decision science should address the effectiveness
and limitations of motivated beliefs.
20Perhaps goal setting in education works as the open-label sugar pills for students with





In this section, I show that students who complete all three surveys on average
have better academic performance than the rest. It is not surprising since weak
students who seldom check the university email or learning materials are unlikely
to participate in the surveys available online. Also, the slightly better than aver-
age sample in this study turns out to be better suited in the question I study. The
instrumental and consumption motives come into effect only if the students care
about their study. Clearly the sample in this study is highly motivated students
who care about their grades, and may engage in cognitive distortions.
H2 : X1 > X2
GPA Real Score
All-complete Rest of the class p All-complete Rest of the class p
Econ 1a 57.07 (N=34) 49.96 (N=267) <0.01 *** 64.94 (N=34) 61.01 (N=285) 0.01**
Econ 1b 57.65 (N=82) 50.41 (N=271) <0.01 *** 63.45 (N=82) 60.96 (N=273) 0.02**
Econ 2 66.29 (N=34) 59.66 (N=244) 0.04** 60.67 (N=34) 59.48 (N=245) 0.62
Total 59.48 (N=150) 53.14 (N=782) <0.01 *** 63.16 (N=150) 60.53 (N=803) <0.01 ***
Table 5A.7: Summary of Selection Bias
Note: The p-values are reported for two sided WilcoxonMannWhitney test. p < 0.1, *; p < 0.05,
**; p < 0.01, ***.
B Analysis with Students Complete All Surveys
In this section of the Appendix, I replicate the analysis in the main text by exam-
ining only students who complete all three surveys (fully-completed participants).
Therefore for all descriptive statistics and regression results, the total No. of sub-
jects is 150. All tables and figures in the main text are replicated in the same
order. In sum, most results are consistent with the analysis of the all-available
participants data, with the exception of the relationship between self-reported
self-control problem and the attendance record. For the empirical result from all
available participants, there exists a significant negative correlation between the
self-reported degree of self-control problem and the tutorial attendance. However,
such correlation is not identified with fully-completed participants.
The Hypothesis 1 is also rejected with fully-completed participants only. This
result is consistent with the analysis with all-available participants.
The Hypothesis 2 is not rejected with fully-completed participants only. This
result is consistent with the analysis with all-available participants. Specifically
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H1 : X2 > X3
Wilcoxon signed-rank Sign (X2 > X3) Sign (X2 6= X3) N
Econ1a 0.31 0.92 0.36 34
Econ1b 0.68 0.50 >0.99 82
Econ2 0.94 0.58 >0.99 34
Total 0.81 0.71 0.74 150
Table 5A.8: Tests of X2 and X3 (cf. Table 5.4)
Note: With fully-completed participants only (N=150). p-values are reported for each test.
p < 0.1, *; p < 0.05, **; p < 0.01, ***.
for the aggregate sample of fully-completed sample, 29.3% of the students report
the same level of expectations in survey 1 and survey 2; 53.3% of the students
submit lower expectations in survey 2 than in survey 1 and the remaining 17.3%
of the subjects become more confident after the submission.
H2 : X1 > X2
Wilcoxon signed-rank Sign (X1 > X2) Sign (X1 6= X2) N
Econ1a 0.05* <0.01*** 0.02** 34
Econ1b <0.01*** <0.01*** <0.01*** 34
Econ2 <0.01*** <0.01*** <0.01*** 82
Total <0.01*** <0.01*** <0.01*** 150
Table 5A.9: Tests of the Instrumental Motive (cf. Table 5.5)
Note :With fully-completed participants only (N=150). p-values are reported for each test.
p < 0.1, *; p < 0.05, **; p < 0.01, ***.
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Figure 5A.1: Scatter Plots of X2 and X3 (cf. Figure 5.3)
Note: With fully-completed participants only (N=150). The vertical axis stands for the value
of the students’ expectation at survey 2 (X2) and the horizontal axis for survey 3 (X3) . The
blue dashed line is the 45◦ line. The location of the scatter points are slightly jittered to present
the distribution density.
Figure 5A.2: Scatter Plots of X1 and X2 (cf. Figure 5.4)
Note: With fully-completed participants only (N=150). The vertical axis stands for the value of the students’ expectation at
survey 1 (X1) and the horizontal axis for survey 2 (X2) . The blue dashed line is the 45
◦ line. The location of the scatter points
are slightly jittered to present the distribution density.
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wrong: Gender differences and similarities in confidence judgments. Journal of
Educational Psychology , 86 (1), 114.
132
Magnus, J. R., & Peresetsky, A. (2017). Grade expectations: Rationality and
overconfidence. Working Paper .
Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2005). CEO overconfidence and corporate invest-
ment. The Journal of Finance, 60 (6), 2661–2700.
Malmendier, U., & Taylor, T. (2015, November). On the verges of overconfidence.
Journal of Economic Perspectives , 29 (4), 3-8.
Mayraz, G. (2011). Wishful thinking. Working Paper .
McKelvey, R. D., & Palfrey, T. R. (1995). Quantal response equilibria for normal
form games. Games and Economic Behavior , 10 (1), 6–38.
Modica, S., & Rustichini, A. (1999). Unawareness and partitional information
structures. Games and Economic Behavior , 27 (2), 265 - 298.
Moreland, R. L., & Sweeney, P. D. (1984). Self-expectancies and reactions to
evaluations of personal performance. Journal of Personality , 52 (2), 156–176.
Murstein, B. I. (1965). The relationship of grade expectations and grades be-
lieved to be deserved to actual grades received. The Journal of Experimental
Education, 33 (4), 357–362.
Nagel, R. (1995). Unraveling in guessing games: An experimental study. The
American Economic Review , 85 (5), 1313–1326.
Niederle, M., & Vesterlund, L. (2011). Gender and competition. Annual Review
of Economics , 3 (1), 601–630.
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